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Abstract
Most housing transactions are brokered wherein the buyer and seller do not meet in
person. In which case the buyer’s race is not revealed to the seller, so the seller cannot
discriminate based on race. Despite this observation, previous studies find racial price
differentials based on the race of the buyer. We provide evidence that these estimates
suffer from an omitted variable bias attributable to the time-varying attributes of the
house. After controlling for the time-varying attributes of the house, we find that
minority (black and Hispanic) and non-minority (white) buyers pay a similar price
for comparable housing. We also examine whether agent intermediation provides a
channel through which differential treatment can occur. We find no evidence of racial
price differentials at the agent level.
Key Words: Housing, agent intermediation, discrimination, racial price differentials
∗West Virginia University; Email: adam.d.nowak@gmail.com
†San Diego State University; Email: patrick.smith@sdsu.edu
1We would like to thank Valentino Demarco, Nadia Greenhalgh-Stanley, Crocker Liu, Blair Russel, Will
Strange and seminar participants at Arizona State University, the 2017 Urban Economics Association, 2018
American Real Estate Society, and 2018 AREUEA National meetings for helpful comments. All errors are
the responsibility of the authors.
1 Introduction
We find that minority (black and Hispanic) and non-minority (white) buyers pay a similar
price for comparable housing. This finding conflicts with a rich extant literature that finds
evidence of racial price differentials in housing markets.1 First, we replicate the racial price
differentials reported in the extant literature using data from Atlanta, Georgia. Next, we
show that the repeat-sales approach employed in Myers (2004) and Bayer et al. (2017)
suffers from an omitted variable bias stemming from the time-varying attributes of the
house. Although house fixed effects control for the time-invariant attributes of the house,
they do not control for the time-varying attributes. Thus, the repeat-sales pairs are not
necessarily comparable housing.
We control for the time-varying nature of the housing stock using two distinct approaches.
First, we use a series of filters to remove repeat-sales transactions that were purchased by
investors and/or had a short holding period. Filtering out these transactions addresses
concerns that the houses were purchased and rehabbed (i.e. flipped). Second, we augment
the repeat-sales approach with textual information about the time-varying attributes of the
house. After we employ the filters/textual analysis, the racial price differentials in the extant
literature become statistically insignificant indicating that renovations and improvements to
the condition of the house are confounding factors.
The textual analysis we employ uses a data-driven methodology that does not rely on
a predefined word list or dictionary.2 Instead, we use a variable selection procedure for
high-dimensional data that selects relevant words and phrases (tokens) present in the listing
agent’s description of the house. We then include these tokens directly in the repeat-sales
1King and Mieszkowski (1973), Yinger (1978) and Bayer et al. (2017) find that minorities pay a premium
for housing. In contrast, Chambers (1992) and Kiel and Zabel (1996) find that minorities pay less for housing.
We discuss these conflicting results and provide a detailed review of the literature in Section 3.
2The application of textual analysis in academic research has increased significantly over the past decade.
The overwhelming majority of the studies that employ textual analysis in the economics and finance literature
use a predefined word list or dictionary craeted by the researcher. Recently, Baker et al. (2016) use a
predefined word list to create an index of economic policy uncertainty, Loughran and Mcdonald (2011)
construct a finance-specific dictionary.
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estimation. The procedure advances the methodology in Liu et al. (2018) to identify and
delineate between time-invariant and time-varying tokens in unstructured text. Using the
enhanced procedure, we provide evidence that repeat-sales estimates of racial price differen-
tials are subject to an omitted variable bias stemming from the time-varying attributes of the
house. More specifically, we show that including the time-varying tokens in a repeat-sales
model mitigates the bias associated with transactions in which minority buyers purchase
houses that were recently rehabilitated, renovated, or otherwise improved by non-minority
sellers.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to document the absence of racial price
differentials in housing markets. Several controls, which we discuss in the ensuing subsec-
tions, are in place to prevent racial price differentials, so the lack of price-based discrimination
is to be expected.3 This finding does not, however, imply there is no discrimination in hous-
ing markets as minorities may pay a similar price in certain locations, yet face difficulties
when purchasing houses in other locations (i.e. steering).
1.1 Agent Intermediation
In most housing transactions the buyer and seller do not meet or communicate prior to the
closing - if at all. Instead, each party is represented by a real estate agent who acts on their
behalf. This agent intermediation should, in theory, eliminate racial price differentials in
housing markets. If the seller never meets the buyer - discrimination is not feasible. The
lack of racial price differentials supports this conjecture, but does not rule out other forms
of racial discrimination - particularly at the agent level.
In-person fair housing audits and online correspondence studies show that market in-
termediaries are a source of differential treatment in housing markets (Yinger, 1986; Ewens
et al., 2014). As such, we examine whether the pervasive use of real estate agents provides a
3Similar to Yinger (1995) we define discrimination as adverse treatment of an individual based solely on
her or his membership in a particular racial or ethnic group.
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mechanism through which differential treatment occurs.4 In doing so, we shed light on the
following questions: If the buyer and seller never meet, how is the buyer’s race revealed?
Does the race of the buyer’s agent serve as a proxy for the race of the buyer? If so, can a
minority buyer avoid discrimination by hiring a non-minority buyer’s agent? These ques-
tions have several important policy implications that are directly associated with the U.S.
government’s fair housing policy.
Fair housing has long been a central focus of governmental policy. The Fair Housing Act
(FaHA) of 1968 prohibits discrimination in housing on the basis of race, color, national origin,
religion, sex, disability, and the presence of children. In 1988, the Fair Housing Amendments
Act (FaHAA) was enacted to help enforce FaHA. Among other things, FaHAA removed the
limit on punitive damages, lengthened the statute of limitations, and created a system of
administrative judges to handle claims of discrimination. Although considerable progress
was made in the late 20th century, there is still evidence of racial discrimination in housing
markets (Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2008; Hanson and Hawley, 2011; Ewens et al., 2014).
We argue that identifying and understanding the channels through which discrimination
may occur in housing markets can strengthen and aid in the enforcement of the fair housing
policies that are already in place.
1.2 Agent Representation
Although agent intermediation should, in theory, eliminate racial price differentials, it could
also be a the channel through which price-based discrimination occurs. Despite this conjec-
ture, real estate agents role in price-based discrimination has, for the most part, been ignored
in the extant literature. For example, Bayer et al. (2017) note that “the arms-length nature
of agent/broker-facilitated transactions may limit the information the homeowner has about
a potential buyer’s race and ethnicity”, but do not examine the agent/broker channel in their
4Real estate agents were involved in approximately 88% of all housing transactions in 2016 (NAR, 2016a).
Throughout the paper, we use the term real estate agent to refer to all salespeople and brokers. We use the
term listing agent to refer to the agent representing the seller and the term buyer’s agent to refer to the
agent representing the buyer. We discuss alternative agency relationships in an internet appendix.
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analysis. We examine this channel by collecting and classifying the demographic information
for 4,906 real estate agents in Atlanta, Georgia. To the best of our knowledge this is the
first study to examine agent representation by race and estimate racial price differentials at
both the buyer and agent level.
We provide evidence that buyers sort not only into neighborhoods based on race, but
also in terms of agent representation. Minority (non-minority) buyers are disproportionately
represented by minority (non-minority) agents relative to the underlying real estate agent
population. Buyers’ propensity to select agents of a similar race provides a mechanism for
racial discrimination at the agent level through two distinct channels. First, the race of the
buyer’s agent may serve as a proxy for the race of the buyer in negotiations with the listing
agent and seller. Second, the buyer’s agent is the only party in the transaction that almost
certainly knows the buyer’s race, so the buyer’s agent may be the mechanism through which
differential treatment occurs.
Given the racial sorting we document, we test whether price differentials exist at the
agent level. If the race of the buyer’s agent serves as a proxy for the race of the buyer and
white listing agents (sellers) discriminate, it is possible that buyers represented by black
agents pay a premium relative to buyers represented by white agents. This, however, is not
the case. We find that buyers represented by black and white agents pay a similar price for
comparable housing. Although we find no evidence of racial price differentials at the buyer
or agent level, we do not interpret these findings as an absence of any racial discrimination
in housing markets. One concern is that non-minority sellers (listing agents) may prefer not
to work with or are less willing to negotiate with minority buyers (buyer’s agents).5 In which
case, the racial price differentials we report do not capture overt taste-based discrimination
that may be present in housing markets.
Statistical discrimination is another form of racial discrimination that may not be cap-
5A recent survey of individuals that bought a house or tried to buy a house in 2016 finds that nearly half
(48.8%) of the 569 minority buyers felt that sellers or their agents were less eager to work with them because
of their race (Scharnhorst, 2017).
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tured when testing for racial price differentials in housing markets. Ondrich et al. (2003)
find evidence of statistical discrimination that they attribute to an agent’s uncertainty about
black buyers’ ability to put forth successful bids. We examine whether this form of statistical
discrimination has an effect on the price minority buyers pay for housing using data that
identifies preapproved buyers. Preapproved buyers receive a written commitment from their
lender stating that they will extend a home purchase loan up to a specified amount. The
preapproval letter should negate the agent uncertainty documented in Ondrich et al. (2003).
However, we find that controlling for whether the buyer was preapproved has no discernible
effect on the price minorities pay for housing.
1.3 Indirect Financing Controls
Although the bulk of our discussion and analysis focuses on agent intermediation, we recog-
nize that racial price differentials may also be limited by indirect controls tied to mortgage
financing. To obtain financing a third party appraisal is required for most residential loans.
If the appraised value is less than the agreed upon sales price, the buyer has to either (i)
increase their down payment to cover the difference, (ii) renegotiate with the seller, or (iii)
cancel the deal. Regardless of which option the buyer chooses, the appraisal provides the
buyer with an estimate of the house’s market value and offers an escape clause. Real estate
agents are aware of this fact, so it should limit the size of the racial price differentials ob-
served in the market. Of course, this raises concerns that there are unobserved instances in
which the racial price differential was so high that the minority buyer could not afford or
decided not to purchase the house. In which case, racial price differentials associated with
overt taste-based discrimination are censored from the estimates we report.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset
employed in this study. Sections 3 and 4 review previous studies of racial discrimination in
housing markets, highlight their limitations, and discuss the methodology we use to overcome
the limitations. Section 5 presents our findings and Section 6 offers our concluding remarks.
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2 Data
This study focuses on the single-family detached housing market in Atlanta, Georgia from
January 2000 through September 2016. The study area includes the five counties (Clayton,
Cobb, DeKalb, Fulton, and Gwinnett) that form the core of metro-Atlanta. Metro-Atlanta
is an ideal location for this study given its size and racial diversity. According to the 2010
Census, the Atlanta metropolitan statistical area (MSA) was the ninth largest MSA in the
United States and the City of Atlanta was the fifth largest black-majority city.6
The dataset employed in this study draws from several sources: CoreLogic, Home Mort-
gage Disclosure Act (HMDA), and Georgia Multiple Listing Service (GAMLS). The Core-
Logic data includes every real estate transaction recorded in the five counties’ tax assessor
offices from January 2000 through September 2016. The dataset includes the transaction
date, transaction price, deed type, lender name, and loan amount for each transaction. It
also includes a unique identifier for each house, sale date, sale price, and many (nearly)
time-invariant house level characteristics such as square feet living area, lot size, number of
bedrooms, and number of bathrooms.
We match demographic information about the buyer to each transaction in the CoreL-
ogic data using the publicly available loan application registry (LAR) data gathered under
HMDA. The demographic information includes the buyer’s race and ethnicity. We merge the
LAR and CoreLogic data using the following fields: census tract, transaction year, lender
name, and loan amount. We discuss the merge process in more detail in the appendix.
The GAMLS data includes house characteristics available in the CoreLogic data as well
as transaction details (sales price, time-on-market, etc.), and an unstructured written de-
scription (remarks) about the house for every listing from January 2000 through September
2016. We describe how we transform the unstructured text in the remarks into regressors
in Section 4.3. The GAMLS data also identifies the listing agent and buyer’s agent involved
6Detroit (MI), Memphis (TN), Baltimore (MD), and Washington (DC) were the only black-majority cities
with a larger black population.
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in the transaction. We merge the GAMLS and CoreLogic-LAR data using the following
fields: property address, sales date, and sales price. Additional information about the merge
process is provided in the appendix. Prior to merging the three datasets we apply several
filters to clean the data. A detailed list of the filters and descriptive statistics for the full
raw dataset are provided in the appendix.
For the repeat-sales estimates, we drop transactions for any house that sold only once
during the study period. Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the CoreLogic and GAMLS
repeat-sales samples in Panels A and B, respectively. Column 1 in both panels includes
every repeat-sales transaction in which we know the race of the buyer. Columns 2 to 4 are
filtered by neighborhood racial composition. Column 2 includes repeat-sales transactions in
neighborhoods (i.e. census block groups) that were less than 50 percent white according to
the 2010 Census. Columns 3 and 4 include repeat-sales in neighborhoods that are greater
than 50 percent and 80 percent white, respectively. The neighborhood racial composition
cutoffs mirror Bayer et al. (2017).
The top panel of Table 1 reports the number of repeat-sales in each sample and the
frequency in which the houses in the sample sold two, three, or four or more times. As
noted in the previous paragraph, houses that sold once are not included in the repeat-sales
sample, so the proportions are exhaustive. Regardless of the neighborhood demographics,
houses that sold two times represent the majority of the repeat-sales samples. The next
panel displays transaction and house characteristics for each sample. Column 2 in each
panel clearly shows that the housing stock in neighborhoods that are less than 50 percent
white differs from those that are greater than or equal to 50 percent white. The housing
stock is generally older, smaller, and less likely to be purchased by an owner-occupier. For
these reasons, among others, the average transaction price is lower.
The final panel displays the distribution of buyer race for each repeat-sales sample. Fol-
lowing Bayer et al. (2017), we treat ‘Hispanic’ as a race and use the race of both the applicant
and co-applicant in the variable construction process. The results we report do not change
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when we use only the primary applicant’s race. The majority of the buyers in the full (≥0.0)
repeat-sales sample are white. However, the distribution varies according to the racial com-
position of the neighborhood. We examine this dynamic in greater detail in the next section.
2.1 Neighborhood Sorting
When estimating racial price differentials in housing markets one must recognize that buy-
ers are not randomly assigned to neighborhoods. This is particularly important since the
descriptive statistics in Table 1 suggest that non-majority white neighborhoods are system-
atically different than majority white neighborhoods. If these differences are not properly
controlled for, then price estimates for black and Hispanic buyers will be biased.
To highlight the importance of controlling for neighborhood characteristics, such as racial
demographics, we plot density estimates by buyer race using the percent ‘Black or African
American alone’ 2010 census block group level estimates. Panel A of Figure 1 clearly shows
that black buyers are more likely to purchase houses in neighborhoods that are majority
black - especially in census block groups that are greater than 80 percent black. Whereas,
non-black buyers are more likely to purchase houses in census block groups that are non-
majority black. Figure 2 plots house purchases by black and white buyers on a map of
Atlanta. The figure shows that black buyers are more likely to purchase houses on the south
side of the city and white buyers are more likely to purchase houses on the north side of the
city.
2.2 Real Estate Agent Demographics
To examine whether agent intermediation provides a mechanism through which racial price
differentials can occur in housing markets we identify the race of the real estate agents
involved in the transactions. Although the GAMLS data includes the name of the agents
representing the buyer and seller, it does not provide demographic information about the
agents. To overcome this limitation, we used the Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) platform
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to identify the sex, race and ethnicity of the real estate agents.7 Anonymous workers on
the platform were shown images of real estate agents from www.realtor.com. As such, only
agents that are National Association of Realtors (NAR) members are included in this study,
which ensures that every agent received training on housing discrimination.8 The AMT






No individual in the photo
More than one individual in the photo
If the worker selected “No individual in the photo” or “More than one individual in the
photo” the agent is not included in the study. If the worker selected “Female” or “Male”












7Additional information on Amazon Mechanical Turk is available here: https://www.mturk.com/
8NAR membership requires ethics training not only when agents become new members, but once every
four years after. Membership also requires Realtors to pledge to conduct business in keeping with the spirit
and letter of the NAR Code of Ethics. Article 10 of the Code of Ethics includes a firm statement of support
for equal opportunity in housing. This ensures the agents in this study were aware of and had the knowledge
and training necessary to prevent discrimination.
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The race and ethnicity categories match those provided in the HMDA LAR data, allowing
for ease of comparison. Each image was categorized by two independent workers. When
setting up the categorization project in AMT we restricted the task to only include workers
that were rated as “masters”.9 In the case of a disagreement between two workers we
personally reviewed and categorized the image. We also randomly validated 1 percent of the
remaining sample to ensure the categorizations are accurate.
We identify the real estate agent’s race and ethnicity using an approach that is very similar
to the approach employed for the LAR data. Lenders must ask the loan applicant for their
sex, race and ethnicity, but cannot require that the loan applicant provide the information.
If the loan application is submitted by phone, mail or internet and the applicant does not
provide the information, then the information is not required for HMDA reporting purposes
(FFIEC, 2013). However, if the application is submitted in person and the applicant does
not provide the information, the lender is required to “note the applicant’s ethnicity, race,
and sex on the basis of visual observation and surname, to the extent possible.”10 Similar
to the LAR data collection process, we had AMT workers classify the agents’ demographic
information based on a visual observation of their profile picture from the NAR website.
We merge the agent race and ethnicity classifications with the transaction data using
a manually created cross reference file. We create the cross reference file to overcome two
obstacles. First, there are several many-to-one and many-to-many relationships based on
agent names alone. Second, agent names may change over time due to life events (e.g.
marriage, divorce). We overcome these obstacles by matching agents to their unique ID
in the GAMLS data based on their name and transaction set. Using the agent profiles
on www.realtor.com we match at least one transaction listed on the agent’s profile with the
GAMLS data based on property address, sales price, and sale date. We then identify whether
9Amazon monitors worker performance over time and identifies high performing workers. Workers who
demonstrate excellence across a wide range of tasks are awarded the “masters” qualification. “Masters”
must continuously pass a statistical monitoring test to maintain the qualification.
10Additional information on the LAR data collection process available in ‘Appendix B to 12 C.F.R. Part
1003’ of the Guide to HMDA Reporting (FFIEC, 2013).
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the agent represented the buyer or seller based on the agent’s name. If there is a match we
associate the sex, race, and ethnicity of the agent with their unique GAMLS ID.
AMT workers were shown 6,164 real estate agent images. 441 of the images have “No
individual in the photo” or “More than one individual in the photo” and 817 images did not
have a recent transaction listed on www.realtor.com. Descriptive statistics for the remaining
4,906 agents are displayed in Table 2. Approximately 70.1 percent (3,441) of the real estate
agents are female and 29.9 percent (1,465) are male. White agents represent the largest
racial group (79.5 percent) followed by black agents (15.2 percent), Hispanic agents (3.6
percent), and ‘Asian or other’ agents (1.7 percent).11 The NAR reports that 62 percent of
their members are female and that the “typical Realtor is a 53 year old white female” (NAR,
2016b), so it is no surprise that white female agents represent the majority (55.2 percent) of
the sample in Table 2.
2.3 Agent Selection
When estimating racial price differentials one must consider that buyers are not randomly
assigned to their real estate agent. If buyers are more likely to select an agent of the same
race, then the agent’s race may be used as a proxy for the buyer’s race during negotiations.
Table 3 displays a pairwise comparison of the race of the buyer and their agent for every
matched transaction in the GAMLS dataset regardless of whether it was a repeat-sale or not.
The pairwise comparison in Table 3 suggest that the race of the buyer is loosely correlated
with the race of their agent. In other words, buyers disproportionately hire agents of the
same race relative to the underlying real estate agent population.
‘Asian or other’ buyers were represented by ‘Asian or other’ agents in 10.1 percent of
their transactions even though ‘Asian or other’ agents account for 1.7 percent of the agent
11The race of the agent is assigned using a similar process to the buyer. Any agent whose ethnicity is
categorized as Hispanic is assigned to the ‘Hispanic’ agent group regardless of their race. Non-hispanic
agents categorized as American Indian, Asian or Native Hawaiian are assigned to the ‘Asian or other’ agent
group. Non-Hispanic black agents are assigned to the ‘Black’ agent group and non-Hispanic white agents
are assigned to the ‘White’ agent group.
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population. ‘Asian or other’ agents’ 10.1 percent market share among ‘Asian or other’ buyers
is considerably higher than black, Hispanic and white buyers. Black buyers were represented
by black agents in 50.3 percent of their transactions even though black agents account for
15.2 percent of the agent population. Black buyers were the only race that did not employ
white agents the majority of the time, although white agents still represented black buyers
in 46.9 percent of their transactions.
Hispanic buyers were represented by Hispanic agents in 18.2 percent of their transactions
even though Hispanic agents account for 3.6 percent of the agent population. Similar to
‘Asian or other’ buyers, Hispanic buyers hired white agents the majority of the time (73.9
percent). Similar to the other races, white buyers were disproportionately represented by
agents of the same race relative to the agent population. White buyers were represented by
white agents in 94.1 percent of their transactions, even though white agents account for 79.5
percent of the agent population.
Panels B and C of Figure 1 plot density estimates by race for buyer’s agents and list-
ing agents, respectively. The plots by race are similar to Panel A. Black buyer’s (listing)
agents are more likely to represent buyers (sellers) in neighborhoods that are majority black.
Whereas, non-black buyer’s (listing) agents are more likely to represent buyers (sellers) in
neighborhoods that are non-majority black.
3 Racial Discrimination in Housing Markets
3.1 Fair Housing Audits
Fair housing audits are a survey technique in which minority and non-minority applicants are
matched based on family and economic characteristics such that the only difference between
the matched pair is, in theory, their race. The matched pairs successively visit a landlord
or real estate agent in search of housing and the treatment that the two parties receive is
compared. Early studies that used the fair housing audit technique find that black housing
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applicants were told about 10 to 30 percent less housing units than white housing applicants
(Yinger 1986; Page 1995).
Because the fair housing audits are conducted in-person their reliability is tied to how
comparable the applicants are in the matched pairs. Siegelman and Heckman (1993) note
that the audits are only unbiased if the applicants in the matched pairs are identical along all
relevant dimensions except race. Obviously the use of human subjects violates this assump-
tion. Recent studies have moved away from in-person audits, using online advertisements
and email correspondence instead (e.g. Ahmed and Hammarstedt 2008; Hanson and Hawley
2011; Ewens et al. 2014). The switch to online correspondence has not altered the primary
findings of the fair housing audits. The online correspondence studies find that landlords
treat identical information from applicants with minority and non-minority sounding names
differently. The in-person and online audit results establish a link between market interme-
diaries and differential treatment in housing markets, thereby providing motivation for the
conjecture that agent intermediation may be a channel through which differential treatment
occurs in housing markets.
3.2 Racial Price Differentials
Myers (2004) argues that the key to identifying racial price differentials in housing markets
is to “ask whether blacks pay different amounts than whites for identical housing”. The
idiosyncratic nature of the housing market violates this assumption because no two properties
are identical, and the same property may change substantially over time. Previous research
attempts to overcome this obstacle using one of two distinct approaches. We briefly discuss
the two approaches and then provide an overview of the methodology, including our improved
approach, in the following section.
In the first approach, which we will refer to as the hedonic approach going forward,
researchers isolate racial price differentials using a hedonic model that attempts to control
for all characteristics of the house and surrounding neighborhood (King and Mieszkowski
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1973; Yinger 1978; Chambers 1992; Kiel and Zabel 1996; Ihlanfeldt and Mayock 2009). The
primary advantage of the hedonic approach is its representativeness as it includes the entire
sample of housing transactions. Given the heterogenous nature of residential real estate,
the primary disadvantage of the hedonic approach is its susceptibility to omitted variable
bias when relevant time-invariant and time-varying characteristics are not available to the
researcher.
At the house level, an omitted variable bias is an issue if the buyer’s race is correlated
with unobserved condition and quality. For example, if one race has a higher level of income
and wealth, then members of that race will likely purchase housing that is in better condition
(and/or higher quality) relative to other housing in the same neighborhood. If the condition
and quality of the house are not properly controlled for, the estimated racial price differential
for the wealthier race is biased upwards. Similarly, if buyers sort into neighborhoods based on
their race and those neighborhoods offer different amenities that are not controlled for, then
the estimated racial price differential is biased. This is a concern given the neighborhood
sorting we document in Section 2.1.
In the second approach, which we will refer to as the repeat-sales approach going forward,
researchers control for the time-invariant attributes of the house and neighborhood using
house fixed effects (Myers 2004; Bayer et al. 2017). The primary advantage of the repeat-
sales approach is its ability to compare “identical” housing when condition is held constant.
However, we show that including house fixed effects alone does not yield identical housing
when the condition of the house varies over time. In other words, including house fixed
effects ensures the same house is compared and controls for time-invariant attributes, but it




We assume the log price of house n at time t, pnt, can be written as a hedonic price equation
pnt = xntβ + bntτ + µn + ψnt + vnt︸ ︷︷ ︸
unt
(1)
In Equation 1, xnt is a vector of observable time-invariant and time-varying variables selected
by the researcher, β is a vector of implicit prices, bnt is either a scalar indicator variable or
vector of indicator variables for the race of minority buyer, τ is the price effect associated
with minority buyers’ transactions, µn (ψnt) is a time-varying (time-invariant) effect not
observed by the researcher, and vnt is a zero-mean error term uncorrelated with xnt, bnt, µn,
or ψnt. xnt includes a set of standard house-specific attributes (square footage, bedrooms,
bathrooms, etc.) and either additively or mutiplicatively separable dummy variables for the
time of sale (quarter by year) and location (zip code or census tract).
We refer to µn and ψnt as the quality and condition of the house, respectively, and
emphasize that these features are observed by the buyer, seller, and their agents, but not
necessarily by the researcher. In other words, µn and ψnt include salient information that is
not readily available to the researcher. When µn > 0, the property is high quality and has
certain time-invariant attributes that are better than average (e.g. preferable school districts
or proximity to amenities). When ψnt > 0, the property is in great condition from either
a recent capital expenditure or exceptional maintenance by the homeowner. Conversely,
when ψnt < 0, the property is in poor condition. Indicators of properties in poor condition
include property damage from fires or flood, functional obsolescence, and general neglect of
necessary property maintenance.
The parameter of interest is τ . When τ > 0, minority buyers pay a premium relative
to non-minority buyers. When house fixed effects are not included as regressors, the least-
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squares estimate of τ in Equation 1, τ̂H , is biased if E[bnt(µn + ψnt)] 6= 0. For example,
if minority buyers are more likely to purchase housing of higher (lower) quality in average
condition and house-specific fixed effects are omitted, then µn > 0 (µn < 0) and τ̂H is upwards
(downwards) biased. This observation motivates the repeat-sales approach described in the
following section.
4.2 Repeat-sales approach
Using the subsample of houses that sold at least twice, the hedonic approach can easily
be converted to a repeat-sales approach by including house fixed effects.12 When house
fixed effects are included as regressors, the Frisch-Waugh-Lowell theorem states that the
repeat-sales estimate τ̂R is equivalent to the within-property estimator
p∗nt = pnt − p̄n = x∗ntβ + b∗ntτ + ψ∗nt + v∗nt (2)
In Equation 2, p∗nt is the difference between the transaction price for property n at time







nt. By construction µ
∗
n = 0, so all time-invariant attributes of the
house are removed regardless of whether or not they are observed by the researcher. When
xnt includes variables that are time-invariant or seldom change over time (square footage,






nt plus the change in local market prices
over time. In equation 2, the repeat sales approach precludes µn from biasing τ̂R. However,
τ̂R, remains biased upwards if E[b∗ntψ∗nt] > 0.
House fixed effects are only meaningful when house n has 2 or more transactions.13 An
12The repeat-sales approach in Bailey et al. (1963), Case and Shiller (1989), and Mayer (1998) uses
differenced sale prices as the dependent variable, while Bayer et al. (2017) include property-specific fixed-
effects and use level sale prices as the dependent variable. Both approaches control for time-invariant
attributes and are identical when each property sells exactly twice.
13When this is not true, the house-specific fixed effect perfectly predicts price and the transaction provides
no information on β or τ .
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obvious concern is that the sample of houses with repeat-sales may not be representative
of the entire sample of transactions. For example, suppose a house is purchased at time t1,
renovated, and then sold shortly after at time t2 > t1. In other words, the house is flipped.
For simplicity, assume these are the only two transactions for the property in the data and




E [ψnt2 − ψnt1 ] > 0 (3)
If white buyers purchase houses, make improvements, and then sell the renovated houses
to minorities, then τ̂R is upwards biased. This occurred frequently as demonstrated by the
property descriptions in Table 4. The three repeat-sales pair examples in Table 4 represent
a small subsample of a large set of transactions that involve a white buyer who purchased
a house, performed renovations, and then sold the house to a black buyer soon after. If not
properly controlled for, the price changes associated with the renovations bias τ̂R upwards
and τ̂R > 0 can be misinterpreted as a black-white price differential.
Including regressors that control for major renovations can mitigate bias, but such con-
trols are not available in most datasets. For example, county assessor offices frequently record
time-invariant, house-specific attributes but rarely record time-varying, house-specific at-
tributes. Sufficiently large capital improvements that require a building permit are recorded,
but may not be available in transaction databases maintained by the county. Moreover,
modest capital improvements including new cabinetry, new appliances, and other cosmetic
improvements that do not require a building permit are not available in transaction databases
maintained by the county or municipality.
One way to remove the bias associated with flipped properties is to exclude repeat-sales
with short holding periods from the sample. After running baseline estimates with the
full repeat-sales sample we exclude repeat-sales with holding periods of three years or less.
Holding period filters are commonly used in the real estate literature. For example, Levitt
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and Syverson (2008) drop any house that is sold twice within a three year period “due to
concerns that the house has been purchased and rehabbed for sale”. Of course, there is no
guarantee the properties that remain after filtering are representative of the entire sample
of transactions.
Alternatively, Liu et al. (2018) describe methods for incorporating textual information
about the house in a hedonic pricing model in order to mitigate an omitted variable bias
that does not require excluding transactions from the data set. The MLS remarks section
(remarks) provides an unstructured written description of the house provided by the listing
agent at the time the house is listed for sale. As indicated in Table 4, the remarks include
time-varying information about the house that is not necessarily available in databases main-
tained at the county level. In the following subsections, we summarize the methodology in
Liu et al. (2018) and highlight the extension we employ in this paper to identify and delineate
between the time-invariant and time-varying attributes of the house.
4.3 Textual analysis
Nowak and Smith (2017) and Liu et al. (2018) show that the textual information in the MLS
remarks can be used to proxy for both µn and ψnt. A token refers to any word or phrase in
the remarks and the set of the K = 2, 000 most frequent tokens form a candidate token set.
The candidate tokens are chosen based on their frequency in the remarks and not on any
ex-ante beliefs about their ability to proxy for µn + ψnt. In this way, we remain agnostic as
to which tokens represent the condition and quality of the property. The information in the
tokens can be incorporated into a hedonic model using indicator variables where wntk = 1 if
token k is in the agent’s remark for house n at time t and wntk = 0, otherwise.
Text, by nature, is high-dimensional. As such, the number of indicator variables can
be large and parameter estimates can overfit the data for even moderately large data sets.
However, we assume that Q K relevant tokens can provide a sufficient approximation to
µn + ψnt such that
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µn + ψnt =
∑
k∈S
wntkθk + rnt (4)
In Equation 4, S ⊂ {1, ..., K} is the index of the Q relevant tokens, θk is the implicit price of
token k, and rnt is an approximation error. When the approximation error is uncorrelated
with bnt, S is known, the indicator variables associated with S are included alongside xnt and
bnt in a regression, and the least-squares estimate of τ is consistent and has an asymptotically
normal distribution. In practice, S is unknown and this estimation procedure in infeasible.
However, a feasible estimator using an estimate of S is possible using double-selection




′ = arg min
β,τ,θ
∑
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λ, φp,k, and φd,k are positive scalars that penalize θk.
15 Equation 5 is an `1 penalized regres-
sion and a variant of the LASSO.16 The shape of the penalty performs variable selection
by setting some parameters in θ̂p and θ̂b to 0. The loadings φpk and φbk control for het-
eroscedasticity in the error term. The index of the Q̂p non-zero coefficients in θ̂p is defined
as Ŝp ⊂ {1, ..., K} and similarly for Q̂b and Ŝb.
Intuitively, solving Equation 5 is analogous to finding the set of tokens, both time-
invariant and time-varying, that best predict price. However, the set of variables that are
14We summarize the variable selection procedure here and refer the reader to Belloni et al. (2014) and Liu
et al. (2018) for a more in-depth discussion.
15λ = 2c
√
NΦ−1(1 − γ/2K) where N is the total number of transactions, c = 1.10, and γ = 0.10. The
choices of c, γ are recommended in Belloni et al. (2014). We show the choice of penalty parameters has









nt where vnt is the error term in the hedonic equation. Feasible choices
for φp,k, φb,k are determined using an iterative procedure described in Belloni et al. (2014).
16LASSO: Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator
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necessary for resolving the omitted variable bias may include weak predictors of price not
included in Ŝp. However, solving Equation 6 mitigates this concern by identifying strong
predictors of bnt. Define Ŝ2 = Ŝp ∪ Ŝb as the index of tokens with non-zero coefficients in
either Ŝp or Ŝb. Tokens in Ŝ2 are either strong predictors of price or moderate predictors of
price that are strong predictors of bnt. Alternatively, the omission of tokens not in Ŝ2 from
a regression is unlikely to yield biased estimates of τ .
Belloni et al. (2014) define the post double-selection estimator as the least-squares esti-
mator τ̂2 using xnt and tokens in Ŝ2 as controls. Of course, when Ŝ 6= S, variable selection
mistakes have occurred, and the model is misspecified. However, when a sparse θp pro-
vides a reasonable approximation to µn + ψnt, the selection criteria in Equations 5 and 6
ensure variables in S excluded from Ŝ have a negligible impact on τ̂2. Moreover, the post
double-selection estimator is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed (Belloni
et al., 2014).17 Moreover, for our purposes, the set of tokens in Ŝ is sufficient for removing
the omitted variable bias in the estimate of τ associated with µn + ψnt.
4.4 Time-varying tokens
The previous section describes a method to identify relevant time-invariant and time-varying
tokens. This section extends the variable selection procedure in Liu et al. (2018) to show
that a repeat-sales method can be used to identify the subset of tokens in S that proxy for
the time-varying attributes in ψnt. Using the same set of K = 2, 000 candidate tokens and
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17See Theorem 1 of Belloni et al. (2014) for details on the assumptions and Corollaries 2 and 3 for linear
models.
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the index of the non-zero coefficients in θ̂∗p and θ̂
∗




p ∪ Ŝ∗b . Solving
Equations 7 and 8 is identical to Equations 5 and 6 using property demeaned variables.
However, tokens in Ŝ∗p indicate relevant tokens after controlling for time-invariant factors at









In Equation 9, r∗nt is an approximation error. Although tokens that indicate time-invariant
attributes of the property may be included in the candidate set, these tokens will not have
any impact on p∗nt and, with perfect model selection, will not be included in Ŝ
∗
2 .
The enhanced variable selection procedure identifies the subset of relevant tokens that
approximate the “unobserved” time-varying attributes (ψ∗nt) in Equation 2. By construction,
the complementary subset of tokens in Ŝ2 that are not in Ŝ
∗
2 correspond with the “unob-
served” time-invariant attributes (µn) in Equation 1. When running the empirical analysis,
we include the time-varying and time-invariant tokens separately in Equation 2 to demon-
strate the efficacy of our approach. In doing so, we show that it is (is not) the time-varying
(time-invariant) attributes of the house that bias the racial price differentials in the extant
literature.
Belloni et al. (2016) describe the cluster-LASSO that accounts for the panel structure of
data when selecting Ŝ∗2 . As pointed out in Belloni et al. (2016), ignoring within property
correlation induced by the within transformation may lead to φ∗pk and φ
∗
bk that are too
small and a set of relevant tokens that is too large. If the additional tokens were selected
at random, this would not normally distort estimates and standard errors. However, the
additional tokens selected are the most correlated with the noise and can have a significant
impact on statistical inference. Theorem 3 in Belloni et al. (2016) demonstrates that when
penalty loadings in φ∗pk and φ
∗




can lead to valid statistical inference on τ . Where applicable, we provide results for both
the heteroscedastic-LASSO in Belloni et al. (2014) and the cluster-LASSO in Belloni et al.
(2016).
5 Results
5.1 Baseline hedonic and repeat-sales
The estimates in Table 5 provide a baseline for comparing the approach we employ in sub-
sequent analysis. Panel A of Table 5 uses the hedonic approach and Panel B uses the
repeat-sales approach. Similar to the extant literature, the two approaches yield conflicting
results. The hedonic approach estimates that black buyers pay, on average, 1.9 percent less
than white buyers. While the repeat-sales approach estimates that black buyers pay, on
average, 3.6 percent more than white buyers. The disparity is likely related to (i) black
buyers sorting into different neighborhoods/housing that are not properly controlled for in
the hedonic approach (E[bnt(µn+ψnt)] < 0) and (ii) improvements to time-varying attributes
that are not properly controlled for in the repeat-sales approach (E[ψnt] > 0). We address
these issues using a repeat-sales approach that either employs a series of filters or includes
time-varying tokens that are selected using our enhanced textual analysis procedure.
5.2 Repeat-sales with filters
Table 6 reports black-white and Hispanic-white price differentials using the repeat-sales
approach. The racial price differentials are organized in two panels. Panel A presents the
black-white price differentials and Panel B presents the Hispanic-white price differentials for
the entire repeat-sales sample and several filtered subsamples. Both panels report estimates
relative to non-Hispanic white buyers.
Four distinct specifications that differ only in their underlying neighborhood racial com-
position are reported in columns 1 to 4 of both panels. Column 1 includes all repeat-sales
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transactions (percent white ≥ 0.0). Column 2 includes repeat-sales transactions in neigh-
borhoods that are less than 50 percent white. Column 3 includes repeat-sales transactions
in neighborhoods that are greater than or equal to 50 percent white and column 4 includes
transactions in neighborhoods that are greater than or equal to 80 percent white. Unsurpris-
ingly, the proportion of black-white transactions in column 2 is considerably greater than
column 4.18
The baseline black-white price differentials reported in Panel A of Table 6 match the
repeat-sales estimates in Panel B of Table 5. The baseline black-white price differential
is 3.6 percent in column 1 of Panel A. However, the black-white coefficient estimates vary
considerably by neighborhood racial composition in columns 2 to 4. The Hispanic-white price
differential is 1.2 percent for the full repeat-sales sample in Panel B. However, the Hispanic-
white estimates are statistically insignificant in columns 2 to 4 when the neighborhoods are
partitioned based on their racial composition.
We apply a series of cumulative filters to ensure the repeat-sales sample is relatively
homogeneous and remove repeat-sales pairs that are most susceptible to a time-varying
omitted attribute bias. The first filter uses the occupancy field in the LAR data to identify
and remove transactions that are not “owner-occupied as a principal dwelling”. The filter
removes rental properties and houses that were purchased by investors. We remove rental
houses since they are typically of lower quality and have more wear and tear relative to owner-
occupied houses (Wang et al., 1991). The owner-occupied filter reduces the magnitude of
both the black-white and Hispanic-white price differentials. Additionally, the Hispanic-white
price differential is no longer statistically significant.
The next set of filters address the concern that houses purchased by buyers of different
races may have undergone differential amounts of renovation or maintenance during the hold-
ing period of the previous owner. We filter out houses that were flagged in the tax assessor
18We provide a detailed breakdown of the transaction type by race for each subsample in the appendix.
We partition the neighborhoods by percent white to facilitate comparison with the estimates in Bayer et al.
(2017). In an internet appendix we provide estimates using percent black to partition the neighborhood
racial composition in columns 2 to 4. The estimates are similar for the filtered subsamples.
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data as having undergone a major renovation and transactions with a holding period of three
years or less. The holding period filter removes houses that were purchased, renovated, and
resold in a short period of time (i.e. flipped), thereby limiting the effect of the renovations
that were performed on the racial price differential estimates. After applying the second set
of filters, the black-white and Hispanic-white price differentials are no longer statistically
significant.
The final filter removes all repeat-sales transactions in which the house was involved
in at least one distressed (shortsale or REO) transaction during the study period. The
filters are cumulative, so the final row of Table 6 includes repeat-sales transactions that are:
owner-occupied, not flipped or remodeled, and not distressed. The statistically insignificant
racial price differentials show that minority and non-minority buyers pay a similar price for
comparable housing.
5.3 Repeat-sales with tokens
The filtered results in Table 6 suggest the baseline estimates of τ̂R are biased by “unob-
served” changes to the time-varying attributes of the house. To further investigate this
claim, we augment the repeat-sales regression with information about the property that is
easily observed and available, but frequently excluded since it is provided to the researcher
in a high-dimensional text format. More specifically, we include indicator variables for key
words and phrases (tokens) from the agents’ remarks about the property. The remarks field
is only available in the GAMLS data, so the racial price differentials in this section are
estimated using the repeat-sales sample in Panel B of Table 1.
The three panels in Table 7 incorporate three different types of tokens. Panel A incor-
porates unigram (one word) tokens, Panel B incorporates bigram (two word) tokens, and
Panel C incorporates flex-gram (multi-word) tokens. Additional information about the token
creation process is available in the appendix. Column 1 of each panel provides a baseline
result prior to incorporating the tokens. The remaining columns present specificiations that
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incorporate either time-varying tokens (column 2), time-invariant tokens (column 3), or both
(column 4).
Prior to introducing the tokens, the black-white price differential in column 1 of Panel A
is 1.9 percent. However, after we incorporate the time-varying tokens in column 2, the black-
white price differential decreases to 0.9 percent and is no longer statistically significant. This
result provides additional evidence that the racial price differentials reported in the extant
literature are biased by changes to the time-varying attributes of the house that are not
properly controlled for in the regression.
Figure 3 displays ten of the most positive (e.g. renovated, new, and less) and negative
(e.g. shortsale, asis, and opportunity) time-varying tokens. At first glance some of the
tokens may seem contradictory. For example, the word less typically takes on a negative
connotation and the word opportunity typically takes on a positive connotation. However,
houses that have a “roof that is less than two years old” sell for a premium and houses that
offer an “opportunity” often need some work and sell for a discount. The use of bigrams and
more elaborate flex-grams help address this confusion but do not affect estimates of τ . More
importantly, the tokens in Ŝ∗2 represent time-varying attributes of the house that, when not
properly controlled for, bias the racial price differentials in column 1.
The third column of Panel A incorporates only the time-invariant unigram tokens. In
contrast to column 2, the black-white price differential is statistically significant at the 5
percent level. This result bolsters the claim that the tokens in column 2 control for the time-
varying attributes of the house that bias black-white price differentials in Column 1 and in the
extant literature. The time-invariant unigram tokens identify positive and negative attributes
of the house that do not change over time. For example, several local neighborhoods are
included in both the positive (e.g. brookhaven, oakhurst, and roswell) and negative (e.g.
parkview and kennesaw) tokens. Given that the repeat-sales approach differences out time-
invariant attributes of the house, such as the neighborhood it is located in, it is no surprise
that including these attributes in the repeat-sales specification has a neglible effect on the
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racial price differential coefficient estimates.
Column 4 incorporates both time-varying and time-invariant tokens. Similar to col-
umn 2, the black-white price differential is statistically insignificant. Overall, the enhanced
variable selection procedure does a good job of delineating between the time-varying and
time-invariant tokens in the remarks. There are, however, a few time-invariant tokens that
one would expect, ex-ante, to be included in the time-varying tokens (and vice-versa). For
example, the vacant token is classified as time-invariant in Figure 3 although it has time-
varying features. However, houses that are vacant when they are listed for sale at time t1
may have a higher probability of being vacant the next time they are put up for sale at time
t2. In which case, it makes sense that the vacant token is classified as time-invariant.
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The results in Panels B and C of Table 7 are nearly identical to Panel A. Regardless of
the type of token employed (unigram, bigram, or flex-gram) the racial price differential is
statistically insignificant when the time-varying textual information is included. We provide
a description and example of every time-varying and time-invariant unigram token in Figure
3 in an internet appendix. Additional insight into the bigram and flex-gram tokens is also
provided in an internet appendix.
5.4 Finite Sample Considerations
The post double-selection estimator is an asymptotic result. To establish the finite sample
credibility of our claims that the repeat-sales post double-selection estimate in the previous
subsection is statistically insignificant, we perform a simulation experiment. The simulations
determine the power of the post double-selection estimator to detect τ ∈ {0.005, 0.010, ..., 0.020}.
The τ considered correspond to previously reported estimates in the literature as well esti-
mates in Table 7. The variables pnt and bnt are generated using parameters estimated from
the data for 500 simulations of each τ . Further details of the simulation experiment are
19For example, it is doubtful that a “flipper” will buy a house if it is occupied by a tenant with a long-term
lease. Instead, they are more likely to target vacant fixer-uppers that they start renovating immediately. In
which case, the house is vacant when they purchase it and when they sell it.
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described in an internet appendix.
Results of the simulations are displayed in Figure 4. The two lines correspond to the
fraction of simulations where H0 : τ = 0 is rejected using either a 5% or 10% significance
level, respectively. Standard errors are heteroscedastic consistent. Standard errors clustered
at the property level yield similar results and are available upon request. The results of the
simulation suggest that the procedure described in the paper can reliable detect τ ≥ 0.01.
This result is encouraging given previous point estimates in the literature suggest τ ≈ 0.02.
5.5 Financing controls
The results presented in the preceding sections provide strong statistical evidence that mi-
nority and non-minority buyers pay a similar price for comparable housing. The estimates,
however, could be correlated with other buyer attributes that affect the home buying pro-
cess. Table 8 presents results from additional specifications that control for the buyer’s access
to financing and financial position. This is particularly important given that Ondrich et al.
(2003) find evidence of statistical discrimination that they attribute to an agent’s uncertainty
about black buyers’ ability to put forth successful bids.
Prior to representing a buyer in the home search process most real estate agents require
the potential buyer to be either prequalified or preapproved for a loan. The prequalification
process relies on the loan applicant’s self-reported assets, debt, income, and credit score.
Based on this self-reported information, the lender provides an estimate of the loan amount
that the applicant qualifies for. However, the lender provides no guarantee that they will
approve the loan in the prequalification letter. In contrast, the preapproval process provides
“a written commitment to the applicant valid for a designated period of time to extend
a home purchase loan up to a specified amount.”20 Thus, the preapproval process should
negate the agent uncertainty in Ondrich et al. (2003).
The first column of Table 8 provides baseline estimates similar to the racial price dif-
20See Section 203.2(b)(2) of Regulation C in the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act for more information.
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ferentials in the final row of column 1 in Table 6. Note, however, that the repeat-sales
samples in Tables 6 and 8 differ slightly since we drop repeat-sales pairs in Table 8 where
the income of the buyer is not available for at least one of the transactions. In column 2
we include an indicator variable that identifies whether the buyer was preapproved by their
lender. The black-white coefficients do not change when the preapproval variable is included
in the specification. The coefficient on the preapproval variable is negative, which suggests
that getting preapproved may reduce the sales price, although the coefficient is statistically
insignificant.21
Columns 3 and 4 report results for specifications that add the buyer’s income and down
payment percentage. Bayer et al. (2017) note that these variables may be correlated with
sales price for a number of reasons, including the ability to secure financing and differences
in search costs. The inclusion of these financial controls has a neglible impact on the racial
price differentials, thereby providing additional evidence that minorities and non-minorities
pay a similar price for comparable housing.
5.6 Agent racial price differentials
Agent intermediation should, in theory, eliminate racial price differentials in housing markets.
If the seller and their listing agent never meet the buyer, then the buyer’s race is not revealed.
In which case, sellers cannot discriminate against the buyer. The racial price differentials
we present in the preceding sections support this conjecture. However, the fact that buyers
sort into agent representation based on race (see Section 2.3) suggests that the race of
buyer’s agent may serve as a proxy for the race of the buyer. As such, we test for racial
price differentials at the agent level. More specifically, we test whether buyers represented
by black agents pay a similar price as buyers represented by white agents for comparable
housing.
21Approximately 4.7 percent of the repeat-sales transactions involved a buyer that was preapproved. 4,863
of the repeat-sales transactions involved black buyers. Of which, approximately 4.1 percent were preapproved.
Interacting the preapproval and race variables in the specification did not affect the results. The interaction
term was also statistically insignificant.
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Table 9 presents black-white price differentials for the repeat-sales transactions in which
we know the race of the buyer’s agent.22 The format of Table 9 is similar to Table 6 in
that we (i) report estimates for four distinct specifications that differ only in the underlying
neighborhood racial composition and (ii) apply a series of filters to remove repeat-sales
transactions that are most susceptible to a time-varying attribute bias. The baseline black-
white price differential is statistically insignificant in all but one column of the first row. This
finding holds as we filter the data to remove non-owner-occupied purchases, short holding
periods, and distressed transactions. Thus, we conclude that buyers represented by black
agents and white agents pay a similar price for comparable housing.
5.7 Study Limitations
Although the dataset utilized in this study is rich in terms of observable house, neighborhood,
and buyer attributes it does have several limitations. The collection and classification of the
real estate agents’ demographic information was performed once, so the racial profile of the
agent network is static. In reality, the agent network is dynamic so its racial profile likely
changes over time.23 Because the agent network in this study represents a snapshot in time
we recognize that there may be a survivorship bias in terms of the agents included in this
study. However, given the time consuming task and difficulty/cost of identifying the race of
agents who are no longer active in the network we leave this inquiry for future research.
The inability to consistently identify agent race in historical transactions also limits our
ability to run a repeat-sales specification that includes the race of both the buyer and their
agent. Ideally, we would test whether buyers represented by agents of a different race pay
a similar price relative to buyers represented by agents of the same race. For example, we
would test whether black buyers represented by white agents pay a similar price as black
buyers represented by black agents. Unfortunately, this analysis is not possible due to the
22Descriptive statistics for the buyer’s agent repeat-sales sample are provided in the appendix.
23This is especially true in the late-2000s when the economy went into a recession. During this time period,
membership in NAR dropped from a high of 1,357,732 in 2006 to 999,824 in 2012 according to the NAR’s
historical data on membership (NAR, 2017).
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limited number of repeat-sales in which we know the race of both the buyer and their agent.
We also recognize that membership in the National Association of Realtors (NAR) is
optional, and that we were forced to drop 1,258 of the 6,164 agent records listed on the NAR
website because they were missing a photo or did not have a matching transaction in the
GAMLS data. If membership in NAR or posting a photo on www.realtor.com is correlated
with agent race, then the racial profile of the agent network we present may be skewed. To
partially address this concern we compared the number of agents in this study (4,906) to the
number of unique agent IDs in the GAMLS dataset with at least one transaction in 2016. The
results show that the agent network we examine represents a large proportion (68.7 percent)
of the agents that had at least one transaction in 2016. In addition to its representativeness,
we chose to identify the race of agents using photos from the NAR website because it ensures
that the agents included in our study received training on housing discrimination and fair
housing policy.
6 Conclusion
Whether minorities pay more than non-minorities for comparable housing has important
policy implications. Thus, it is no surprise that it remains a central concern in the liter-
ature studying racial discrimination in housing markets. After replicating the racial price
differentials reported in the extant literature we show that the estimates suffer from an
omitted variable bias stemming from the time-varying attributes of the house. We control
for the time-varying attributes using two distinct approaches. The first approach employs
a series of filters to remove repeat-sales transactions that are most susceptible to the time-
varying attribute bias. The second approach controls for the time-varying attributes using
textual analysis instead of filters. Regardless of the approach taken we find that minority
and non-minority buyers pay a similar price for comparable housing.
The textual analysis we employ highlights the fact that the repeat-sales approach does
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not (does) control for the time-varying (time-invariant) attributes of the house. Using a novel
variable selection procedure, we carefully delineate between time-invariant and time-varying
tokens (i.e. textual information) and then include the tokens separately in the repeat-sales
specification. As expected, the inclusion of the time-invariant tokens has no effect on the
racial price differentials. However, the inclusion of the time-varying tokens renders the racial
price differentials statistically insignificant.
We also examine the dimensions along which differential treatment can occur in housing
markets. We show that buyers are disproportionately represented by agents of the same
race relative to the underlying real estate agent population. As a consequence, the agent’s
race may serve as a proxy for the buyer’s race during negotiations. Using a repeat-sales
estimation that incorporates the race of the buyer’s agent, we find no evidence of racial
price differentials at the agent level. Although we find no evidence of price-based racial
discrimination at the buyer or agent level, the results we report do not rule out other forms
of racial discrimination in housing markets (steering, blockbusting, etc.).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the repeat-sales transaction data
Panel A: CoreLogic Buyer Panel B: GAMLS Buyer
≥0.0 <0.5 ≥0.5 ≥0.8 ≥0.0 <0.5 ≥0.5 ≥0.8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Observations 97,001 32,013 64,988 27,619 35,224 10,712 24,512 9,621
Repeat-sales (proportions)
Sold twice 0.80 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.88 0.90 0.87 0.86
Sold three times 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.13
Sold four or more times 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
House characteristics
Price (000s) 256.28 167.80 299.87 363.08 242.46 165.65 276.02 332.77
Sfla (000s) 2.29 1.85 2.51 2.70 2.29 1.95 2.44 2.60
Age 28.28 31.47 26.72 30.04 26.88 27.36 26.66 30.92
Bedrooms 3.41 3.18 3.52 3.61 3.69 3.48 3.78 3.89
Bathrooms 2.72 2.32 2.92 3.08 2.61 2.35 2.72 2.86
Owner-occupier 0.90 0.83 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.90 0.94 0.95
Buyer race (proportions)
Asian and other 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.06
Black 0.22 0.48 0.09 0.05 0.19 0.43 0.09 0.05
Hispanic 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.04
White 0.63 0.34 0.77 0.85 0.65 0.38 0.77 0.85
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the repeat-sales data used in the empirical analysis. The
data includes single-family detached houses in Atlanta, Georgia that transacted more than once from Jan-
uary 2000 through September 2016. Panel A includes every repeat-sales transaction in which we successfully
match a transaction in the CoreLogic data with a loan in the LAR data. Panel B is a subsample of Panel A
in which we successfully merged the CoreLogic-LAR data with the GAMLS data. Columns 2 to 4 are filtered
by neighborhood racial composition in both panels. Column 2 includes repeat-sales transactions in neigh-
borhoods that are less than 50% white. Column 3 (4) includes repeat-sales transactions in neighborhoods
that are greater than or equal to 50% (80%) white.
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Table 2: Agent race and sex
Female Male Total
(1) (2) (3)
White 2,709 1,192 3,901
(55.2%) (24.3%) (79.5%)
Black 546 202 748
(11.1%) (4.1%) (15.2%)
Hispanic 129 46 175
(2.6%) (0.9%) (3.6%)
Asian and other 57 25 82
(1.2%) (0.5%) (1.7%)
Total 3,441 1,465 4,906
(70.1%) (29.9%) (100.0%)
Notes: This table cross tabulates the race and sex of the 4,906 real estate agents included in this study. The
agents’ race is tabulated vertically and their sex is tabulated horizontally in descending order.
36
Table 3: Buyer and agent race
Buyer’s Race
Asian Black Hispanic White Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Asian and other 228 55 22 234 539
(10.1%) (1.1%) (1.3%) (0.9%) (1.5%)
Black 159 2,579 115 630 3,483
(7.0%) (50.3%) (6.6%) (2.4%) (9.9%)
Hispanic 143 92 317 678 1,230
(6.3%) (1.8%) (18.2%) (2.6%) (3.5%)
White 1,726 2,406 1,285 24,638 30,055
(76.5%) (46.9%) (73.9%) (94.1%) (85.1%)
Total 2,256 5,132 1,739 26,180 35,307
(6.4%) (14.5%) (4.9%) (74.1%)
Notes: This table displays the total number of transactions by the race of the buyer and their agent. The
number of transactions by buyer race is tabulated vertically and the number of transactions by agent race
is tabulated horizontally. The buyer and their agent’s race are both sorted alphabetically.
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Table 4: Repeat-sales with short holding periods
Repeat-sales pair #1
Zip code Sale date Price Buyer race
30144 3/31/2005 $107,000 White
MLS Remark: fixer upper on a great street in kennesaw! 4 sides brick hardwoods throughout,
huge kitchen. good bones. renovate and sell or renovate and rent. sold as is.
—"— 6/12/2006 $155,000 Black
MLS Remark: fantastic like new home in historic kennesaw. Completely renovated with new
roof, gutters, hardwoods, paint, cabinets, baths, appliances, and fenced back yard.
Repeat-sales pair #2
Zip code Sale date Price Buyer race
30084 1/3/2006 $175,000 White
MLS Remark: fabulous brick home. open floor plan, oversized rooms, large master. large
landscaped lot. quick access to 285, northlake mall. needs some tlc. call for offer details.
—"— 7/27/2006 $239,000 Black
MLS Remark: newly renovated blonde brick ranch on large landscaped lot. updated kitchen
and baths w/new corian & marble countertops. new lighting, gleaming hardwoods & tile
fireplaces. must see all the updates!
Repeat-sales pair #3
Zip code Sale date Price Buyer race
30039 8/3/2005 $105,000 White
MLS Remark: two story brick in norris lake, bank foreclosure needs tlc.
—"— 12/22/2005 $215,000 Black
MLS Remark: a must see, new carpet, new paint, new garage door w/ opener, 96 acre
lake community w/playground, pool, tennis, & fishing. relandscaped yard, new septic tank,
completely renovated.
Note: This table displays three repeat-sales transaction pairs in which the first transaction involved a white
buyer and the second transaction involved a black buyer. The repeat-sales pairs were selected to provide
examples of black-white transactions that had short holding periods.
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Table 5: Baseline black-white price differentials
Panel A: Hedonic Panel B: Repeat-sales
≥0.0 <0.5 ≥0.5 ≥0.8 ≥0.0 <0.5 ≥0.5 ≥0.8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Black buyer −0.019∗∗∗−0.013∗∗∗−0.031∗∗∗−0.041∗∗∗0.036∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.021
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.015)
N 160,844 59,753 101,091 39,453 97,001 32,013 64,988 27,619
R2 0.876 0.770 0.884 0.877 0.985 0.971 0.987 0.989
Controls X X X X X X X X
House Characteristics X X X X
Block Group + Time FE X X X X
House FE X X X X
Tract x Time FE X X X X
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: The dependent variable in every column is the log of sales price. Panel A includes all transactions
where we know the race of the buyer, regardless of the number of times the house transacted. Panel B only
includes houses that transacted at least twice during the study period (i.e. repeat-sales). Every column
includes controls for distressed (shortsale and REO) transactions. Panel A uses a hedonic estimation that
includes house characteristics, whereas Panel B uses house fixed effects. The house characteristics include
continuous measures (log of age and log of square feet living area) and indicator variables (acres, bedrooms,
bathrooms, garage, carport, and pool). Columns 2 to 4 are filtered by neighborhood racial composition in
both panels. Column 2 includes transactions in neighborhoods that are less than 50 percent white. Column
3 (4) includes transactions in neighborhoods that are greater than or equal to 50 (80) percent white.
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Table 6: Buyer racial price differentials
Panel A: Black-white differential Panel B: Hispanic-white differential
≥0.0 <0.5 ≥0.5 ≥0.8 ≥0.0 <0.5 ≥0.5 ≥0.8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) Obs.
Baseline 0.036∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.021 0.012∗∗ 0.029 0.004 0.006 97,001
(0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.015) (0.006) (0.021) (0.006) (0.014)
Owner-occupied 0.022∗∗∗ 0.044∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.011 0.004 0.021 −0.001 0.004 80,528
(0.006) (0.024) (0.006) (0.015) (0.006) (0.028) (0.007) (0.016)
Hold > 1,095 0.016 0.038 0.001 −0.026 −0.001 −0.001 −0.004 0.013 53,919
(0.011) (0.066) (0.010) (0.024) (0.011) (0.081) (0.011) (0.028)
No distress 0.005 0.019 −0.011 −0.038 −0.017 −0.061 −0.018 −0.011 40,811
(0.013) (0.078) (0.013) (0.030) (0.011) (0.073) (0.012) (0.025)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: The estimates are derived from a regression of log transaction price on a set of transaction controls,
fixed effects, and race indicators. The transaction controls include indicator variables for houses that were
remodeled or involved in a distressed transaction (e.g. shortsale or REO). Both house and tract by time fixed
effects are included in every specification. Column 1 of Panels A and B include all repeat-sales transactions.
Columns 2 to 4 are filtered by neighborhood racial composition. Column 2 includes repeat-sales transactions
in neighborhoods that are less than 50 percent white. Column 3 (4) includes repeat-sales transactions in
neighborhoods that are greater than or equal to 50 (80) percent white. Additional cumulative filters are
applied in descending order by row as follows: Baseline includes the entire repeat-sales sample; Owner-
occupied filters out investor purchases; Hold > 1,095 filters out properties that were flipped within three
years or remodeled; No distress filters out all repeat-sales pairs in which at least one transaction was a
distressed sale. Standard errors clustered at the house and time level are reported in brackets.
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Table 7: Repeat-sales with tokens
Panel A: Unigram tokens
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black buyer 0.019∗∗ 0.009 0.016∗∗ 0.011
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
N 35,224 35,224 35,224 35,224
R2 0.943 0.954 0.946 0.957
Panel B: Bigram tokens
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black buyer 0.019∗∗ 0.009 0.015∗∗ 0.010
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
N 35,224 35,224 35,224 35,224
R2 0.943 0.949 0.945 0.950
Panel C: Flex-gram tokens
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black buyer 0.019∗∗ 0.010 0.017∗∗ 0.011
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
N 35,224 35,224 35,224 35,224
R2 0.943 0.954 0.946 0.956
House FE X X X X
Time FE X X X X
Time-Varying Tokens X X
Time-Invariant Tokens X X
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: The dependent variable in every column is the log of sales price. All models include a set of house and
time fixed effects. Tokens are single word (unigram), two word (bigram), or multi-word (flex-gram) phrases
from the MLS remarks. Column 1 includes no tokens, column 2 includes time-varying tokens, column 3
includes time-invariant tokens, and column 4 includes both time-varying and time-invariant tokens. All
standard errors are two-way clustered at the house and time levels.
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Table 8: Racial price differentials with financial controls
Baseline Preapproval Income Downpayment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black buyer 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.005
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)










N 39,186 39,186 39,186 39,186
R2 0.962 0.962 0.962 0.963
House FE X X X X
Tract x Time FE X X X X
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: The estimates are derived from a regression of log transaction price on a set of fixed effects and
race indicators. The repeat-sales sample used in this table does not include investor purchases, holding
periods less than 3 years, distressed transactions, or transactions in which the buyer’s income is unavailable.
Both house and tract by time fixed effects are included in every specification. Column 1 presents a baseline
estimate using the filtered repeat-sales sample. Columns 2 to 4 additively introduce a series of financial
controls: preapproval, buyer income, and downpayment. Standard errors clustered at the house and time
level are reported in brackets.
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Table 9: Buyer’s agent racial price differentials
Black-white differential
≥0.0 <0.5 ≥0.5 ≥0.8
(1) (2) (3) (4) Obs.
Baseline 0.020 0.083 −0.033 0.075∗ 12,331
(0.020) (0.063) (0.021) (0.045)
Owner-occupied 0.020 0.086 −0.026 0.076 11,788
(0.021) (0.068) (0.022) (0.047)
Hold > 1,095 −0.039 −0.044 −0.034 0.013 8,193
(0.025) (0.113) (0.025) (0.061)
No distress −0.014 −0.024 −0.008 0.001 6,849
(0.026) (0.151) (0.026) (0.045)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: The estimates are derived from a regression of log transaction price on a set of transaction controls,
fixed effects, and race indicators. The transaction controls include indicator variables for houses that were
remodeled or involved in a distressed transaction (e.g. shortsale or REO). Both house and tract by time fixed
effects are included in every specification. Column 1 includes all repeat-sales transactions. Columns 2 to 4 are
filtered by neighborhood racial composition. Column 2 includes repeat-sales transactions in neighborhoods
that are less than 50% white. Column 3 (4) includes repeat-sales transactions in neighborhoods that are
greater than or equal to 50% (80%) white. Additional cumulative filters are applied in descending order
by row as follows: Baseline includes the entire repeat-sales sample; Owner-occupied filters out investor
purchases; Hold > 1,095 filters out properties that were flipped within three years or remodeled; No distress
filters out all repeat-sales pairs in which at least one transaction was a distressed sale. Standard errors
clustered at the house and time level are reported in brackets.
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Figure 1: Kernel Density by Race
Notes: This figure plots density estimates by race and neighborhood composition for three distinct market
participants. Panel A plots the transaction density by buyer race relative to the fraction of the neighborhood’s
population that is black. Panel B and C plot similar densities for buyer agent and listing agent race,
respectively. The neighborhood’s racial composition is measured at the 2010 census block group level.
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Figure 2: Transactions by race in Atlanta, Georgia
Panel A: Black buyers Panel B: White buyers
Notes: This figure plots the geographical distribution of house purchases by the race of the buyer. Panel A
plots house purchases by black buyers and Panel B plots house purchases by white buyers.
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Figure 3: Implicit prices for unigram tokens
Time-varying tokens Time-invariant tokens
Notes: The top ten positive and negative time-varying and time-invariant unigram tokens are displayed.
The implicit prices displayed in the figure represent the token’s coefficient from the first stage of the double-
selection LASSO procedure.
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Figure 4: Post Double-Selection in Finite Samples




































● 5%   Significance Level
10% Significance Level
Notes: This figure displays simulation results for the finite sample performance of the post double-selection
estimator. The figure displays the fraction of simulations where H0 : τ = 0 is rejected at either a 5% or
10% significance level. Simulations use dimensions (N = 35, 224, time fixed effects, house fixed effects, and
K = 2, 000 candidate tokens) and parameter estimates taken from the repeat-sales data set. Details of the
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To eliminate outliers, we drop transactions that do not meet the following criteria:
1. $30,000 ≤ sales price ≤ $3,000,000
2. 500 ≤ square feet of living area ≤ 6,000
3. 1 ≤ bedrooms ≤ 6
4. 1 ≤ bathrooms ≤ 6
5. age ≥ 2
6. acres ≤ 5
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A.2 Merge process
This section describes the data preparation and merge process that combines the informa-
tion from three data sources: CoreLogic, HMDA, and GAMLS. Prior to merging the three
datasets we clean the raw data using the filters listed in Section A.1. After cleaning the
data we use the CoreLogic data to join both the publicly available loan application registry
(LAR) data collected under HMDA and the GAMLS data. Merging the GAMLS and LAR
data directly is not possible.
The merge process joins the CoreLogic and LAR data using the following fields: census
tract number, lender, loan amount, and year. A house’s census tract assignment can change
over time, so we identify the appropriate census tract number for each transaction based on
the year of the transaction. Transactions prior to 2003 use their 1990 Census assignment;
transactions from 2003 through 2011 use their 2000 Census assignment; and transactions
from 2012 forward use their 2010 Census assignment. We use the first three characters of
the lender’s name to avoid dropping matches where the lender’s name is abbreviated in one
of the two files (e.g. Wells Fargo Bank versus Wells Fargo Bank NA).
Prior to merging the two files, we drop duplicate records based on the unique identifier
that is formed using the four fields. Just under 5 percent of the transactions in the CoreLogic
data are dropped because they are duplicates. Approximately 63.2 percent of the remaining
sales transactions in the CoreLogic dataset are successfully matched. The match rate is
comparable to Bayer et al. (2017). The resulting dataset includes 282,095 transactions. Of
which, 97,001 are repeat-sales transactions.
Next we merge the GAMLS file with the CoreLogic-LAR dataset using the following
fields: property address, sale date (mm/yyyy), and sales price. Duplicate records in which
the house has multiple transactions within the same month are dropped. We do not require
an exact match on sales price. Instead, we first match records based on the property address
and sale date fields. Then we drop records in which the sales price is not within a plus or
minus three percent range. The resulting dataset includes 160,844 transactions. Of which,
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35,224 are repeat-sales transactions.
Descriptive statistics for the full, repeat-sales, and non-repeat-sales merged datasets are
provided in Table A1. Panel A displays the descriptive statistics for every transaction in
which we know the race of the buyer. Panel A represents the merged CoreLogic-LAR dataset
which does not include the textual information about the house (i.e. remarks) or identify the
real estate agents involved in the transaction since both datapoints are only available in the
GAMLS. Panel B represents a subsample of Panel A in which we were able to successfully
merge the CoreLogic-LAR data with the GAMLS data. The subsample in Panel B includes
transactions in which we know the race of the buyer, regardless of whether we were able to
identify the race of the real estate agents involved in the transaction. In contrast, Panel C
includes transactions in which we know the race of the buyer’s agent, regardless of whether
we were able to identify the race of the buyer involved in the transaction.
Table A1: Descriptive statistics for the merged datasets
Panel A: CoreLogic Buyer Panel B: GAMLS Buyer Panel C: Buyer’s Agent
Full Repeat Single Full Repeat Single Full Repeat Single
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Observations 282,095 97,001 185,094 160,844 35,224 125,620 82,427 12,331 70,096
House characteristics
Price (000s) 246.89 256.28 241.96 233.26 242.46 230.67 256.49 277.75 252.76
Sfla (000s) 2.32 2.29 2.34 2.30 2.29 2.30 2.38 2.36 2.39
Age 26.08 28.28 24.92 25.33 26.88 24.90 28.27 30.60 27.86
Bedrooms 3.43 3.41 3.45 3.72 3.69 3.73 3.75 3.70 3.76
Bathrooms 2.73 2.72 2.74 2.63 2.61 2.64 2.71 2.70 2.71
Owner-occupier 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.92
Race (proportions)
Asian and other 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.02
Black 0.26 0.22 0.29 0.26 0.19 0.28 0.12 0.08 0.12
Hispanic 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04
White 0.57 0.63 0.54 0.56 0.65 0.53 0.83 0.88 0.82
CoreLogic X X X X X X
LAR X X X X X X
GAMLS X X X X X X
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A.3 Paired repeat-sales transactions by race
We report racial price differentials for several filtered subsamples in Table 6. For each filtered
subsample, we also report racial price differentials across differing neighborhood racial com-
positions in columns 1 to 4. Column 1 includes all repeat-sales transactions (percent white
≥ 0.0). Column 2 includes repeat-sales transactions in neighborhoods that are less than 50
percent white. Column 3 includes repeat-sales transactions in neighborhoods that are greater
than or equal to 50 percent white and column 4 includes transactions in neighborhoods that
are greater than or equal to 80 percent white.
Given that buyers sort into neighborhoods based on race, the number of black-white
transactions likely differs based on the racial composition of the neighborhood. Table A2
provides a detailed breakdown of the transaction type by race for each filtered subsample.
The results in Panel A show that transactions involving black and white buyers/sellers are
much more likely to occur in non-majority white neighborhoods (19 percent) relative to
majority white neighborhoods (10 percent). Whereas, transactions involving Hispanic and
white buyers/sellers represent 4 percent of the sample in non-majority white neighborhoods
and 7 percent of the sample in majority white neighborhoods.
The results in Table A2 also highlight the fact that the filters remove a higher percentage
of repeat-sales transaction pairs in non-majority white neighborhoods relative to majority
white neighborhoods. For example, the first filter we apply in the paper identifies and
removes purchases by individuals that are not owner-occupiers. The filter removes approxi-
mately 17.6 percent of the repeat-sales pairs in column 1 of Panel B. However, a much higher
percentage of repeat-sales pairs in non-majority white neighborhoods are removed relative
to majority white neighborhoods (28.6 percent in column 2 versus 12.2 percent in column 3).
This result suggests that investors were more active in non-majority white neighborhoods
during the study period.
The second filter drops houses that were remodeled and/or held for less than three years.
The filters are cumulative, so the second filter removes approximately 34.9 percent of the
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repeat-sales pairs. Unlike the first filter, the effect of the second filter is fairly uniform across
the neighborhood racial compositions (38.9 percent in column 2 versus 33.4 percent in column
3). The third and final filter removes all repeat-sales pairs in which at least one transaction
is a distressed sale. Similar to the first filter, a much higher percentage of repeat-sales pairs
in non-majority white neighborhoods are removed relative to majority white neighborhoods
(38.2 percent in column 2 versus 19.5 percent in column 3).
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Table A2: Paired repeat-sales transactions by race
≥0.0 <0.5 ≥0.5 ≥0.8
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Baseline
Black-to-Black 0.13 0.34 0.02 0.01
Black-to-Hispanic 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00
Black-to-White 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.03
Hispanic-to-Black 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Hispanic-to-Hispanic 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
Hispanic-to-White 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
White-to-Black 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.04
White-to-Hispanic 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04
White-to-White 0.49 0.20 0.63 0.74
Other types 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.12
Transaction pairs 51,943 17,073 34,870 14,864
Panel B: Owner-occupied
Black-to-Black 0.10 0.31 0.02 0.01
Black-to-Hispanic 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00
Black-to-White 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.03
Hispanic-to-Black 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Hispanic-to-Hispanic 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
Hispanic-to-White 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
White-to-Black 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.04
White-to-Hispanic 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
White-to-White 0.53 0.23 0.64 0.75
Other types 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.12
Transaction pairs 42,816 12,189 30,627 13,379
Panel C: Hold > 1,095
Black-to-Black 0.09 0.28 0.02 0.00
Black-to-Hispanic 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00
Black-to-White 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.03
Hispanic-to-Black 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Hispanic-to-Hispanic 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00
Hispanic-to-White 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
White-to-Black 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.04
White-to-Hispanic 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04
White-to-White 0.54 0.25 0.65 0.75
Other types 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.12
Transaction pairs 27,860 7,451 20,409 8,907
Panel D: No Distress
Black-to-Black 0.06 0.22 0.01 0.00
Black-to-Hispanic 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00
Black-to-White 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.02
Hispanic-to-Black 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Hispanic-to-Hispanic 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Hispanic-to-White 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
White-to-Black 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.04
White-to-Hispanic 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
White-to-White 0.60 0.30 0.68 0.76
Other types 0.16 0.21 0.15 0.12
Transaction pairs 21,038 4,604 16,434 7,679
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B Tokenization process
B.1 Cleaning and standardization
The tokens in this study refer to either single words (unigrams), two-word phrases (bigrams),
or words or phrases that are constituent parts of larger phrases (flex-grams).24 Before creat-
ing the tokens, we perform a series of steps to clean and standardize the remarks. The steps
are performed in the following order:
1. Convert to lower case.
2. Replace commas (,) periods (.), ampersands (&) and the word and with “ STOP ”. A space is
placed at the beginning and end of STOP .
3. Replace all special characters with a space.
4. Replace apostrophes.
5. Remove all remaining single letters.
6. Replace all numbers with a space. Numbers can be in either numeric or character form.
7. Remove repeated STOPs and trim white space at the beginning and end.
8. Use open-source spell checking software (hunspell) to correct spelling mistakes.
9. Depluralize.
10. Remove a list of stop words (e.g. a, the, and but).
After cleaning the remarks, we create indicator variables based on the presence of a given
token in the remarks. The K = 2, 000 most frequent tokens form a candidate token set.
However, only the Q  K relevant tokens identified by the variable selection procedure
are included in the repeat-sales specification. We futher differentiate the relevant tokens
into time-varying and time-invariant token sets as follows. First, we identify the relevant
tokens when house fixed effects are included. Then we identify the relevant tokens when
house fixed effects are not included. By construction, the complementary tokens capture the
time-invariant attributes of the house.
In unreported results, we test the sensitivity of our findings using alternative tokenization
processes including, but not limited to, the use of raw remarks (i.e. uncleaned tokens) and
24See Liu et al. (2018) for a detailed description of the flex-gram token creation process.
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stemmed tokens. Whether or not the text is preprocessed affects the number of tokens (Q2,
Q∗2) selected by the variable selection procedure, but has no discernible affect on τ̂R. In other
words, the racial price differentials reported in Table 7 are not sensitive to the use of the
raw text or stemmed tokens.
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C Textual Analysis (Internet)
C.1 Unigram tokens
The bulk of the unigram tokens displayed in Figure 3 are self-explanatory. However, some
tokens require additional explanation. This section provides a description of the top ten
positive and negative time-varying and time-invariant unigram tokens displayed in Figure 3.
It also provides an example of each token in a public remark.
C.1.1 Time-varying positive token descriptions
Token: renovated
Description: The renovated token identifies houses whose condition has been recently im-
proved.
Example: completely renovated bungalow w/ open front porch, hardwood floors, beautiful
new bathrooms, huge dining room and kitchen which leads to a large flat backyard that is
great for entertaining.
Token: granite
Description: The granite token identifies houses that have granite countertops.
Example: total renovation in this 1920’s candler park bungalow. kitchen has new granite
countertops,viking appliances & custom cherry cabinets. master bath has granite, marble &
double sinks. bring your buyers. this will not last long!
Token: less
Description: The less token identifies features of the house (i.e. roof, hvac, appliances, etc.)
that were recently updated.
Example: back on market! fabulous 4 sided brick ranch with tons of possibilities. home has
great bones and looking for that new owner ready to make it their own. roof is less than 2
years old. come on and check it out to see the potential!
Token: new
Description: The new token identifies features of the house that are brand new.
Example: outstanding home! incredible neighborhood! award winning schools! i’ll try to
cover most features; hardwood floors throughout, updated kitchen with new appliances and
cabinets, 4 large bedrooms with a complete master suite with plenty of space and natura
Token: custom
Description: The custom token identifies features of the house that were built specifically
for the house in question.
Example: mint condition newer home in a prime “intown” location! huge open floorplan,
hardwood floors, new carpet upstairs, new interior paint throughout, stunning master suite,
custom walk in closet, professionally landscaped! excellent schools!
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Token: grade
Description: The grade token identifies “high end” features of the house.
Example: gorgeous 3 br, 2.5 ba home in fantastic location! great open floor plan features
foyer, 2-story family room, updated ceiling fans & light fixtures. wonderful open kitchen
w/granite countertops & professional grade appliances. hardwood floors throughout.
Token: oasis
Description: The oasis token identifies houses with attractive landscaping and backyards.
Example: drop dead gorgeous! backyard oasis - come home and relax and unwind in this
spectacular outdoor entertainment area! beautiful grounds include salt water pebble tec
pool/spa with cascading waterfalls! spacious and open newer construction home with high-
end features throughout.
Token: immaculate
Description: The immaculate token identifies houses in great condition.
Example: immaculate & pristine home! over 150k in upgrades! mahogany wood w/cherry
stained cabinets & wood throughout. 2 story family room with stone fireplace & bookcases.
bonus room that can serve as large office or 5th bedroom.
Token: fully
Description: The fully token identifies houses that have been completely renovated.
Example: fully renovated beautiful home. kitchen and bathroom floors upgraded to ceramic
tile. new hardwood laminate flooring throughout all living areas and bedrooms. new energy
saving hvac unit installed in 2014. all bathrooms have new high efficiency toilets on top of
tons of other upgrades.
Token: complete
Description: The complete token identifies houses that have been fully renovated.
Example: complete renovation down to the studs! owner spared no expense. hardwoods
throughout the living and bedroom areas, travertine tile in the kitchen and laundry room.
new stainless steel appliances, granite counter tops, and kitchen island over looking fabulous
gourmet kitchen.
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C.1.2 Time-varying negative token descriptions
Token: shortsale
Description: The shortsale token identifies sellers whose mortgage balance is greater than
the house’s market value (i.e. distressed transactions).
Example: approved shortsale. approved price is $112,000. very nice home in well established
community. carpet and paint needed. investors and first time home buyers are welcome.
please see private remarks. buyer must prequal and use closing attorney.
Token: asis
Description: The asis token identifies properties that are sold “as is”. In other words, the
seller will not make improvements to the property, so the buyer must factor the cost of the
improvements into their offer.
Example: charming all brick ranch, 2 bed rooms, formal dining room, side porch and more.
in need of some tlc, sold as-is with lots of potential. must see!!
Token: prequalify
Description: The prequalify token typically identifies distressed transactions in which the
buyer must be prequalified to make an offer.
Example: great investment property with beautiful wood floors and kitchen. Bright dining
area, 2 bedrooms, 1 full bath, a great room and a den. Foreclosure. Must prequalify with
lender.
Token: proof
Description: The proof token typically identifies distressed transactions in which cash buyers
must provide “proof of funds” prior to making an “all cash” offer.
Example: sold as-is, where-is. no property disclosure. no termite letter. must have pre-
approval letter, or proof of funds for cash, with offer. seller chooses closing attorney.
Token: bank
Description: The bank token identifies bank owned (i.e. distressed) transactions. These
transactions are commonly referred to as real estate owned (REO) transactions.
Example: bank owned, needs minor tlc! 3 sided brick. sold as-is, sun room, cash/cnv only,
must prequalify and provide copy of em check. call for addendums.
Token: need
Description: The need token identifies houses in disrepair.
Example: multi-level in need of repair/renovation. sold as-is w/ no disclosure or inspection
right. prequalify or proof of funds required with offer or auto-rejected. $2000 earnest money
deposit.
Token: opportunity
Description: The opportunity token typically identifies investment properties that need some
work.
Example: for professional renovations only, cash cow opportunity for savvy investors. only
buying at $130k after repair value up to $350k great for small side project rent out in 7 days.
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Token: approval
Description: The approval token typically identifies distressed transactions in which the
buyer must already be approved for the loan to make an offer.
Example: motivated seller submit any & all offers. priced to sale. needs minor repairs. all
offers must include approval & earnest money.
Token: investor
Description: The investor token identifies rental properties and/or fixer uppers that can be
flipped for a profit.
Example: perfect for the investor looking for a turnkey & profitable rental property. open
floor plan with ample closet and storage space. beautiful natural light fills the home. back
deck and patio are perfect for weekend barbecues in expansive backyards.
Token: disclosure
Description: The disclosure token identifies sellers that do not provide a disclosure. This is
common in distressed sales transactions.
Example: super corporate value! inspect, compare & price for area! 3/2 frame ranch on
slab, living room, bonus rm, deck - no termite or seller’s disclosure.
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C.1.3 Time-invariant positive token descriptions
Token: brookhaven
Description: The brookhaven token identifies a neighbhorhood in Atlanta.
Example: cute home in a sought-after brookhaven location, convenient to 85, amenities,
parks, and schools. hardwood floors, spacious family room, eat-in kitchen, three bedrooms,
two full baths, and a sitting room pass-through off one of the bedrooms that could make a
nice office.
Token: sandy
Description: The sandy token identifies the Sandy Springs neighborhood in Atlanta.
Example: private mountain retreat in the heart of sandy springs! very spacious gourmet
kitchen with all the bells and whistles a cook can only dream of. granite island and coun-
tertop, stainless steel appliances, large breakfast area overlooking the oversized porch.
Token: classic
Description: The classic token identifies houses with vintage features.
Example: mostly renovated classic craftsman bungalow with lots of period details and char-
acter. all rooms are large with original fireplaces - 5 total. big front porch & large deck
overlooking fenced in backyard.
Token: detail
Description: The detail token typically identifies houses that have high quality features in
good condition.
Example: charming craftsman home on quiet cul de sac! living space boasts hardwood floors
& great moulding detail throughout. flowing floorplan, w/ cozy living room, separate dining,
powder room, large office, & bedroom w/ ensuite bath, all on the main level. kitchen w/
granite countertops.
Token: gated
Description: The gated token typically identifies houses that are located in a gated commu-
nity or have a gated pool.
Example: gorgeous stepless ranch in prestigious gated community. beautiful lake front views!
gourmet kitchen features granite and hardwood floors. vaulted family room with fireplace
and built ins. keeping room with fireplace. new paint and new flooring, ready to move in!
Token: oakhurst
Description: The oakhurst token identifies a neighborhood in Atlanta.
Example: pristine bungalow in the heart of oakhurst. just steps to the oakhurst village.
large rooms, new kitchen with granite counters and stainless steel appliances. hardwood
floors throughout, laundry room off of kitchen, separate room off of the master.
Token: roswell
Description: The roswell token identifies a neighborhood in Atlanta.
Example: sought-after roswell subdivision convenient-four sides brick traditional situated on
over an acre-updated kitchen w/ granite counters & stainless appliances - gunite pool.
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Token: park
Description: The park token identifies houses that are located near public parks or located
in a neighborhood that has the word “park” in its name.
Example: live on one of the best streets in all of atlanta. enjoy being able to walk to shops,
restaurants, piedmont park, schools, & the beltline. coveted springdale park elementary
school district. welcoming large front porch overlooks picket fenced front yard.
Token: dunwoody
Description: The dunwoody token identifies a neighborhood in Atlanta.
Example: absolutely beautiful home in prestigous dunwoody area. over 200k in renova-
tions. chef’s kitchen w/granite, stainless steel appliances, maple cabinets, wine fridge &
sunroom/breakfast room. beautiful landscaped lot with private backyard.
Token: walton
Description: The walton token identifies a school district in Atlanta.
Example: classic beauty in walton high school district! walking distance to dodgen too!
living room with french doors leads to paneled den with fireplace. upgraded kitchen with
granite & stainless appliances. spacious breakfast room. front & rear stairs. large bonus
room.
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C.1.4 Time-invariant negative token descriptions
Token: kennesaw
Description: The kennesaw token identifies a neighborhood in Atlanta.
Example: a beautifully maintained ranch home in a convenient kennesaw location, open floor
plan, vaulted ceilings, new ceramic tile in kitchen & baths, all new lighting throughout the
house.
Token: eatin
Description: The eatin token identifies houses with kitchens that double as dining rooms.
Example: price reduced! motivated owners, bring all offers; clean and in good condition;
master on main, whirlpool tub, walkin closets, gourmet eatin kitchen, large livingroom w/
fireplace, office w/ builtin shelfs.
Token: vacant
Description: The vacant token identifies houses that are unoccupied when they are listed
for sale.
Example: great schools! vacant but staged. totally renovated & stunning. custom kitchen
with granite and stainless appliance. vaulted ceilings. formal living room & dining room
private fully fenced.
Token: investment
Description: The investment token typically identifies rental (i.e. investment) properties.
Example: investors delight instant equity, seller has apprasial, owner agent, basement finish,
walk out, home warranty offered. great for investment property. currently tenant occupied
with solid rental income.
Token: sell
Description: The sell token frequently identifies motivated sellers who must “sell their house
quickly.”
Example: we must sell this house quickly!!! 10k under market value!! 4 bedroom, bonus
room, incredible amount of house for the money!! 3/4 ac lot, beautifully decorated house.
Token: starter
Description: The starter token identifies “starter homes” that typically lack high-end fea-
tures and/or are relatively small compared to the surrounding neighborhood.
Example: this 3 bedroom 2 full bath ranch is priced for a quick sell. great starter home for
small family. interior is freshly painted. owner is motivated! bring all offers!
Token: ranch
Description: The ranch token identifies a construction style.
Example: seller says sell! reduced for smart buyers to get a good deal! bring all the toys -
no hoa. great ranch on full basement & nearly 2 acres! brand new dishwasher & carpeting.




Description: The parkview token identifies a neighborhood in Atlanta.
Example: parkview ranch, split bedroom plan, vaulted open great room, separate wet bar,
oversized master bedroom, walk-in closet, new carpet, new kitchen floor, wonderful screened
porch.
Token: vinyl
Description: The vinyl token identifies houses with vinyl floors, counters and/or siding.
Example: 4 side brick. hardwood floors throughout. plus new vinyl floors in kitchen. fenced-
in backyard. view to family room & separate living room. covered back patio. large bed-
rooms.
Token: split
Description: The split token identifies houses with split foyers, levels and/or bedroom lay-
outs.
Example: awesome split level w/ lower level teen suite! 4bdrm/3full baths, great room w/
fireplace, eat-in kitchen, 2 car garage, level lot w/fenced backyard! mill creek schools!
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C.2 Bigram tokens
This section presents the top positive and negative time-varying and time-invariant bigram
tokens for the repeat-sales sample employed in Panel B of Table 7. The implicit prices
displayed in Figure C1 represent the token’s coefficient from the first stage of the double-
selection LASSO procedure which, by design, shrinks the token’s coefficient towards zero. A
description and example of the bigram tokens are available from the authors by request.
Figure C1: Implicit prices for bigram tokens
Time-varying tokens Time-invariant tokens
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C.3 Flex-gram tokens
This section presents the top positive and negative time-varying and time-invariant flex-
gram tokens for the repeat-sales sample employed in Panel C of Table 7. The implicit prices
displayed in Figure C2 represent the token’s coefficient from the first stage of the double-
selection LASSO procedure which, by design, shrinks the token’s coefficient towards zero. A
description and example of the flex-gram tokens are available from the authors by request.
Figure C2: Implicit prices for bigram tokens
Time-varying tokens Time-invariant tokens
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D Agency Relationships (Internet)
D.1 Agency Relationships
Under the laws of agency as codified for real estate agents in many states today, the listing
agent exclusively represents the best interests of one client, the seller. The relationship
between the buyer and their agent is less clear. An agent may represent the buyer through one
of the following arrangements: buyer agency, designated agency, dual agency, or subagency.
Buyer agency occurs when the buyer signs an agreement, commonly known as a buyer
brokerage agreement, which stipulates that the real estate agent will represent the buyer’s
best interests in locating, negotiating, and purchasing a house. Although the agent represents
the buyer, they are almost always compensated by the seller. This brokerage relationship is
commonly referred to as buyer agency.
In some transactions the agent representing the buyer and seller work for the same broker
or brokerage firm. In which case, the broker may allow each agent to exclusively represent
their respective clients. This brokerage relationship is commonly referred to as designated
agency and the transactions are referred to as in-house transactions.
In Georgia, the law allows one agent to represent both the seller and the buyer as long as
the agent gets the written consent of both parties. In which case, neither party is exclusively
represented by the agent. This brokerage relationship is commonly referred to as dual agency.
The final form of agent representation occurs when an agent works with the buyer, but
represents the seller. This brokerage relationship is commonly referred to as subagency.
Subagency relationships between real estate agents in Georgia, which were once the norm,
are very uncommon today.
Discussions with real estate agents and brokers in the Atlanta area confirmed that sub-
agency is not a concern during our study period. Thus, we assume the relationship between
the buyer and their agent is governed by buyer agency. For this reason, we refer to the agent
representing the buyer as the buyer’s agent. This is necessary when using the CoreLogic-
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LAR data since agent information is not available. However, the GAMLS data includes
fields that identify in-house and dual agency transactions. The inclusion of these fields when
using the GAMLS data does not have a discernible effect on the results we report.
D.2 For sale by owner (FSBO)
Homeowners can sell their house without the services of a listing agent. These sales are
known as For Sale by Owner (FSBO). According to NAR (2017), the primary reasons FSBO
sellers chose to sell their house without an agent were because they did not want to pay a
sales commission (43%), sold to a friend or relative (23%), or were approached directly by a
buyer (10%). When taken at face value, these statistics suggest that FSBO sellers are profit
maximizing and do not choose FSBO to discriminate against buyers.
Comparing prices for FSBO and non-FSBO transactions could identify price effects at-
tributable to real estate agents, ceteris parebis. However, FSBO transactions are, by defi-
nition, not included in MLS data and there is no straightforward way to identify them in
the CoreLogic data. Even if we could identify FSBO transactions there are at least two
concerns we would have to account for. First, a large fraction of FSBO transactions are not
arms length according to the NAR (2017) survey. If the non-arms length transactions are
not flagged in the FSBO data, then it is not clear how to interpret the composite estimate.
Second, we would not know whether the buyer was represented by a buyer’s agent. Just be-
cause the seller chose to forgo agent representation, does not mean that the buyer made the
same choice. In which case, the buyer and seller may not interact or meet until the closing,
so the buyer’s race would not be revealed and the seller could not discriminate against them.
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E Robustness Checks (Internet)
E.1 Flipper covariate in place of filters
Table E1 reports black-white and Hispanic-white price differentials using the repeat-sales
approach. Instead of filtering out houses that were (i) flagged in the tax assessor data as
having undergone a major renovation or (ii) held for less three years or less, we include a
“flipped” indicator variable in the repeat-sales estimation. The results suggest that black
buyers pay approximately 1.6 percent more than white buyers for comparable housing; this
estimate is marginally statistically significant at the 10% level. However, the racial price
differentials are statistically insignificant in columns 2 to 4 at conventional significance levels.
We suspect that the flipped variable does not perfectly control for heterogeneous amounts
of renovation that likely takes place across the housing sample. For this reason, we argue
that the textual analysis approach we employ is more appropriate.
Table E1: Filtered repeat-sales with flipper covariate
≥0.0 <0.5 ≥0.5 ≥0.8
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black buyer 0.016∗ 0.044 0.005 −0.005
(0.008) (0.052) (0.009) (0.020)
Hispanic buyer −0.007 −0.003 −0.012 0.001
(0.009) (0.063) (0.009) (0.019)
Flipped 0.028∗∗∗ 0.017 0.027∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.054) (0.005) (0.010)
Flipped x Black buyer 0.013 0.059 0.003 0.037
(0.020) (0.092) (0.021) (0.051)
Flipped x Hispanic buyer 0.012 0.059 0.004 −0.025
(0.021) (0.128) (0.024) (0.057)
N 60,263 14,150 46,113 21,383
R2 0.992 0.994 0.992 0.992
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: The estimates are derived from a regression of log transaction price on a set of fixed effects, race
indicators, and a variable that identifies if the house was flipped. Houses that were involved in a distressed
transaction are not included. The flipped variable identifies house that were remodeled or held for three
years or less. Both house and tract by time fixed effects are included in every specification. Columns 2 to 4
are filtered by neighborhood racial composition (percent white). Column 2 includes repeat-sales transactions
in neighborhoods that are less than 50 percent white. Column 3 (4) includes repeat-sales transactions in
neighborhoods that are greater than or equal to 50 (80) percent white. Standard errors clustered at the
house and time level are reported in brackets.
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E.2 Pre- versus post-crisis
Table E2 reports racial price differentials using the repeat-sales approach for the filtered
subsamples in Table 6. In this table we interact the buyer race indicators with a post-crisis
indicator variable that identifies transactions that sold after 2007. The baseline estimates
suggest that a large racial price differential existed prior to the crisis, but it became econom-
ically insignificant during the post-crisis period (6.0 percent pre-crisis versus -0.4 percent
post-crisis for black buyers). However, as the data is filtered the magnitude of the racial
price differential decreases until it is statistically insignificant in column 4. The large dis-
parity between the pre-crisis estimates in column 1 relative to column 4 provides additional
evidence that the estimates are biased by time-varying improvements to the house that are
more likely to occur during “good” times (i.e. pre-crisis) versus “bad” times (i.e. post-crisis).
Table E2: Pre- versus post-crisis racial price differentials
Filtered Subsamples
Baseline Owner-occupied Hold ≥ 1,095 No Distress
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black buyer 0.060∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.023
(0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.021)
Hispanic buyer 0.030∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.021 −0.011
(0.008) (0.009) (0.017) (0.023)
Post x Black buyer −0.064∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗ −0.034
(0.011) (0.012) (0.018) (0.027)
Post x Hispanic buyer −0.037∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.036 −0.010
(0.011) (0.013) (0.023) (0.029)
N 97,001 80,528 53,919 40,811
R2 0.985 0.989 0.994 0.996
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: The estimates are derived from a regression of log transaction price on a set of transaction controls,
fixed effects, and race indicators. The transaction controls include indicator variables for houses that were
remodeled or involved in a distressed transaction (e.g. shortsale or REO). Both house and tract by time
fixed effects are included in every specification. The columns differ only in the repeat-sales subsample used in
their estimation. Column 1 uses the baseline repeat-sales sample, column 2 uses the owner-occupied filtered
repeat-sales subsample, column 3 uses the hold > 1,095 filtered repeat-sales subsample, and column 4 uses




The racial price differentials in column 1 of Table 6 are identical to the estimates in column
1 of Table E3 since both tables use the entire repeat-sales sample. In columns 2 and 3, we
examine whether black-white and Hispanic-white price differentials vary across income lev-
els. Transactions that take place in census tracts that have an average income below (above)
the weighted average income in Atlanta are included in column 2 (3). After applying the cu-
mulative filters to remove investor purchases, flipped properties, and distressed transactions
the racial price differentials are statistically insignificant.
Table E3: Buyer racial price differentials using neighborhood income
Panel A: Black-white differential Panel B: Hispanic-white differential
All Low High All Low High
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) Obs.
Baseline 0.036∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.016 0.010∗ 97,001
(0.006) (0.018) (0.005) (0.006) (0.019) (0.006)
Owner-occupied 0.022∗∗∗ 0.030 0.020∗∗∗ 0.004 0.002 0.004 80,528
(0.006) (0.028) (0.005) (0.006) (0.026) (0.006)
Hold > 1,095 0.016 0.056 0.008 −0.001 0.005 −0.001 53,919
(0.011) (0.065) (0.009) (0.011) (0.057) (0.010)
No distress 0.005 0.015 0.004 −0.017 −0.045 −0.014 40,811
(0.013) (0.096) (0.012) (0.014) (0.094) (0.013)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: The estimates are derived from a regression of log transaction price on a set of transaction controls,
fixed effects, and race indicators. The transaction controls include indicator variables for houses that were
remodeled or involved in a distressed transaction (e.g. shortsale or REO). Both house and tract by time fixed
effects are included in every specification. Column 1 of Panels A and B include all repeat-sales transactions.
Columns 2 to 4 are filtered based on the median income of the neighborhood. Column 2 (3) includes only
repeat-sales transactions in neighborhoods that have a below (above) average income. Additional cumulative
filters are applied in descending order by row as follows: Baseline includes the entire repeat-sales sample;
Owner-occupied filters out investor purchases; Hold > 1,095 filters out properties that were flipped within
three years or remodeled; No distress filters out all repeat-sales pairs in which at least one transaction was
a distressed sale. Standard errors clustered at the house and time level are reported in brackets.
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E.4 Alternative neighborhood compositions
The neighborhood racial compositions in Table 6 are based on the fraction of the population
that is white at the census block group level. Instead of using the fraction of the neighborhood
that is white, Figure E1 presents the number of black buyers based on the fraction of the
neighborhood that is black. The figure presents four histograms that differ only in their
application of the cumulative sequential filters in Table 6: owner-occupied, holding period
> 1,095, and no distressed transactions. The bins in each histogram have a width of 0.1
and correspond to the fraction of black residents in each decile. After applying the filters
the resulting subsamples have a larger fraction of black buyer transactions in neighborhoods
with a smaller fraction of black residents. Alternatively, the baseline data set contains more
black buyer transactions in black neighorhoods. We provide similar histograms using the
fraction of white and minority (non-white) residents in Figures E2 and E3, respectively.
Table E4 reports black-white and Hispanic-white price differentials similar to Table 6
except that the neighborhood racial compositions in columns 2 to 4 are delineated using
the fraction of the neighbhorhood that is black (instead of white). Column 1 includes all
repeat-sales transactions (percent black ≥ 0.0). Column 2 includes repeat-sales transactions
in neighborhoods that are greater than 50 percent black. Column 3 includes repeat-sales
transactions in neighborhoods that are less than or equal to 50 percent black and column
4 includes transactions in neighborhoods that are less than or equal to 80 percent black.
The racial price differentials in column 1 of Tables 6 and E4 are identical since they both
use the entire repeat-sales sample. However, the racial price differentials in columns 2 to 4
differ slightly, suggesting that the coefficient estimates are sensitive to the racial composition
filters (percent black versus percent white) used to form the subsample estimates. Critically,
the racial price differentials remain statistically insignificant after the cumulative filters are
applied.
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Notes: This figure displays the number of black buyers based on the fraction of black residents in the
census block group. Bins correspond to the deciles [0, 0.1], [0.1, 0.2], ..., [0.9, 1]. Each histogram is tabulated
using a series of cumulative sequential filters for owner-occupied, holding period > 1,095, and no distressed
transactions.
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Notes: This figure displays the number of black buyers based on the fraction of white residents in the
census block group. Bins correspond to the deciles [0, 0.1], [0.1, 0.2], ..., [0.9, 1]. Each histogram is tabulated
using a series of cumulative sequential filters for owner-occupied, holding period > 1,095, and no distressed
transactions.
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Notes: This figure displays the number of black buyers based on the fraction of non-white residents in the
census block group. Bins correspond to the deciles [0, 0.1], [0.1, 0.2], ..., [0.9, 1]. Each histogram is tabulated
using a series of cumulative sequential filters for owner-occupied, holding period > 1,095, and no distressed
transactions.
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Table E4: Buyer racial price differentials using fraction black
Panel A: Black-white differential Panel B: Hispanic-white differential
≥0.0 >0.5 ≤0.5 ≤0.8 ≥0.0 >0.5 ≤0.5 ≤0.8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) Obs.
Baseline 0.036∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.014 0.009 0.011∗∗ 97,001
(0.006) (0.021) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.041) (0.005) (0.006)
Owner-occupied 0.022∗∗∗ 0.049 0.015∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.004 0.011 0.003 0.003 80,528
(0.006) (0.037) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.068) (0.006) (0.006)
Hold > 1,095 0.016 0.030 0.006 0.014 −0.001 −0.093 −0.000 −0.001 53,919
(0.011) (0.126) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.283) (0.010) (0.010)
No distress 0.005 −0.014 −0.002 0.004 −0.017 −0.036 −0.016 −0.017 40,811
(0.013) (0.202) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.065) (0.013) (0.014)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: The estimates are derived from a regression of log transaction price on a set of transaction controls,
fixed effects, and race indicators. The transaction controls include indicator variables for houses that were
remodeled or involved in a distressed transaction (e.g. shortsale or REO). Both house and tract by time fixed
effects are included in every specification. Column 1 of Panels A and B include all repeat-sales transactions.
Columns 2 to 4 are filtered by neighborhood racial composition. Column 2 includes only repeat-sales trans-
actions in neighborhoods that are greater than 50 percent black. Column 3 (4) includes only repeat-sales
transactions in neighborhoods that are less than or equal to 50 (80) percent black. Additional cumulative
filters are applied in descending order by row as follows: Baseline includes the entire repeat-sales sample;
Owner-occupied filters out investor purchases; Hold > 1,095 filters out properties that were flipped within
three years or remodeled; No distress filters out all repeat-sales pairs in which at least one transaction was
a distressed sale. Standard errors clustered at the house and time level are reported in brackets.
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E.5 Tuning parameters
In the body of the paper, we use the penalty parameters (c= 1.10 and γ = 0.10) suggested
by Belloni et al. (2014) and Belloni et al. (2016) to select the time-varying and time-invariant
tokens. Implicitly, c and γ determine Ŝ2, Ŝ
∗
2 , Q̂2, Q̂
∗
2, τ̂H ,and τ̂R by controlling the amount
of regularization that prevents overfitting. Here, we test the sensitivity of these estimands
to the choice of c and γ by considering the following combinations of c ∈ {1.01, 1.05, 1.10}
and γ ∈ {0.01, 0.10, 0.25}.
We use the same repeat-sales dataset employed in Table 7 to estimate the racial price
differentials in Columns 2-4 of Table 7. The results in the table below show that the penalty
parameters affect the number of time-varying (Q̂∗2) and time-invariant (Q̂2 − Q̂∗2) tokens
selected in columns 3 and 5, but do not have a material impact on the racial price differentials
in columns 4 and 6.
Table E5: Racial price differential estimates with varying penalty parameters
Penalty Time-varying Time-invariant
c γ Q̂∗2 τ̂R Q̂2−Q̂∗2 τ̂R
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1.05 0.01 39 0.010 168 0.016∗∗
1.10 0.01 39 0.010 157 0.015∗∗
1.25 0.01 30 0.009 127 0.016∗∗
1.05 0.10 45 0.009 209 0.014∗∗
1.10 0.10 45 0.009 192 0.016∗∗
1.25 0.10 39 0.010 154 0.016∗∗
1.05 0.25 49 0.009 225 0.014∗
1.10 0.25 46 0.009 212 0.014∗∗
1.25 0.25 39 0.010 168 0.016∗∗
House FE X X
Time FE X X
Controls X X





This section describes the simulation experiments we use to calculate the power of the double-
selection procedure in Belloni et al. (2014) for τ ∈ {0.00, 0.05, 0.010, 0.015, 0.020}. We use
J = 500 simulations for each choice of τ . We run the simulations for the repeat-sales data
using time fixed effects, house fixed effects, and K = 2, 000 candidate tokens.
Price parameters for simulation









′ = arg min
β,τ,θ
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Because LASSO coefficient estimates are shrunk towards 0, we then calculate the post-
LASSO (Belloni and Chernozhukov, 2013) estimates as the least-squares coefficients when
regressing pnt on bnt and the Q̂p variables in xnt and wnt corresponding to the non-zero




p as the post-LASSO estimates and x
PL
nt and
wPLnt as the corresponding regressors. Define τ̂
PL as the post-LASSO estimate of τ . Define
êPLnt as the residual from the post-LASSO estimator. We calculate the predicted value of


























In Equation 11, Λ is the logistic cdf, and the objective function is a penalized likelihood
model. We use the λb that minimizes the 5-fold cross-validated likelihood. Simulation results
78
are not sensitive to other choices of λb near this choise of λ and are available upon request.
We then calculate the (unpenalized) maximum likelihood estimates, β̂MLEb and θ̂
MLE
b , for the





the maximum likelihood estimates, we then calculate π̂nt = Pr(bnt = 1|xnt, wnt, β̂MLEb , θ̂MLEb )
using the logistic function.
Simulation
For each simulation j = 1, ..., J and each τ , we generate yjnt and b
j
nt as
1. Draw bjnt as a Bernoulli random variable with Pr(b
j
nt = 1) = π̂nt
2. Draw εjnt ∼ N (0, 1) and create p
j







The first step ensures bjn is a binary variable. The second step is similar to the wild bootstrap
and allows for heteroscedasticity in the simulated errors. Note, p̂nt is the predicted price
minus the post double-selection estimate τ̂PL. Based on the simulated data, we then estimate
τ using the post double-selection procedure outlined in the paper. For each τ , we record
the fraction of simulations where H0 : τ = 0 is rejected at the 5% or 10% level. Results are
reported below.
Simulation results







Notes: This table displays the fraction of simulations where the post double-selection estimator for the
repeat-sales estimator with tokens identifies a significant τ for τ ∈ {0.005, ..., 0.020}. For each τ , 500
simulations are performed. Reject5% and Reject10% display the fraction of simulations where Hp : τ = 0
is rejected at the 5% or 10% significance level, respectively. The size and power of the test are not equal
for τ = 0 because the post double-selection estimator uses a linear probability model to approximate the
non-linear logistic function Ŝ∗sb .
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